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This dissertation examines the role that institutions play in the existence of
multiple equilibria in models of economic development. In addition, it examines the
dynamics of transition between such equilibria. In the first chapter of this
dissertation, I build a dynamic model of institutional choice, wherein the government
invests in the legal infrastructure in response to the need for the protection of
output from appropriation. A unique equilibrium exists only under commitment,
not under discretion. This would suggest that a measure of institutional quality
must not only consider the extent to which current policies protect property rights
but also include the ability of the government to commit to reform in the long run.
The second chapter of this dissertation examines the effect of adaptive
learning on stability and transitional dynamics between multiple equilibria in a
lV
growth model with human capital externalities. I find that there are two equilibria,
one a poverty trap with no education. Only the poverty trap is locally stable under
learning. However, productivity shocks are not sufficient to generate transitions
between the equilibria. Indeed, productivity shocks must lie below a threshold in
order for the economy to escape the poverty trap. These escape paths do not allow
the economy to transition to the upper steady state. I propose instead the use of
shocks to expectations to permit such a transition.
The third chapter of this dissertation presents an empirical test for the role
that human capital and institutions may play in transitions between equilibria by
estimating a Markov-switching regression. This methodology allows me to
characterize both distinct growth regimes and transitions between them. I explore
the effects of time-varying institutional measures and human capital on transition
probabilities. I find that political and economic institutions are similar in their
effects on transitions and that the time variation in the institutional measure
increases the probability of identifying both miracle growth and stagnation regimes.
Furthermore, human capital has a significant effect on switches between miracle
growth, stable growth and stagnation.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II and the subsequent wave of independence in
many African and Asian countries, one of the most frequently discussed stylized
facts of economic growth has been the large income gap between developed and
developing countries. Despite a few exceptions, the ratio of GDP per capita in
Western Europe and Latin America has increased from 1.8 in 1820 to 2.42 in 1960
and 3.38 in 2006. The more striking divergence is between Western Europe and
Africa, where the ratio increased from 2.96 in 1820 to 13.1 in 2006. The origin of
this" Great Divergence" in income per capita has been the subject of an intense
debate, wherein both economic and political institutions, along with human capital
formation have played a fundamental role. Institutions in this context have been
very broadly defined as the rules and norms which govern both economic and
political behavior. In the empirical literature, those institutions which govern
economic behavior are typically thought of as determining the extent to which
property rights are protected. The dominant theoretical explanation for these
stylized facts has been the existence of poverty traps, due to threshold effects in
various state variables, including economic institutions and human capital.
My purpose in this dissertation is twofold. First, I seek to further explore the
role that economic institutions and human capital externalities play in the
formation of poverty traps and in transitions out of such traps. Second, I examine
2the extent to which variation in the quality of institutions and human capital
accumulations across countries can account for differences in growth patterns, rather
than simply differences in average economic growth over the long run.
In the first essay, which is the second chapter of this dissertation, I consider
the role of the quality of institutions in the formation of poverty traps. The
previous theoretical literature finds that the poor quality of institutions would
necessarily generate poverty traps, and contribute to persistent differences in both
institutions and incomes between countries. While these results are most appealing,
given persistent income gaps between countries, yet these models either completely
suppress the dynamic aspects of the government's optimization problem, or
institutions are treated as a binary rather than a continuous variable. Yet, current
empirical work and discussions of the impact of institutions on growth assume
institutional persistence, as well as a continuum of institutional quality. I
incorporate these assumptions into a model where the government invests in legal
infrastructure, which serves the purpose of protecting output from appropriation. In
the case where the government is able to commit to a sequence of such investment
over the infinite horizon, I find a unique equilibrium. Discretionary policy however
does permit the formation of a poverty trap. I thus propose expanding the
definition of institutions relevant to economic growth to include the ability of the
government to commit to reform in the long run.
In the second essay, which is the third chapter of this dissertation, I turn my
attention to the role of human capital externalities in the formation of poverty
traps. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) find that in a model of economic growth that
human capital externalities lead to the formation of a poverty trap. The lower
steady state corresponding to this poverty trap is locally stable, while that with
positive levels of investment in human capital is saddle-path stable. In this chapter,
3I first characterize the global dynamics of this model under perfect foresight. Then,
I allow for stochastic shocks to aggregate productivity, and study the role of
expectations in transition dynamics. I find that some forms of bounded rationality,
specifically econometric learning, will permit escape from the poverty trap, but will
not necessarily lead to a transition to the upper steady state. Instead, the economy
transitions to an equilibrium of self-sustaining oscillations in human capital
investment. The primary goal of this second essay is to illustrate the role that
expectational shocks may play in determining whether countries escape from
poverty traps.
The third essay, contained in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, discusses
an empirical test of the role that institutions and human capital may play in
explaining differences in patterns of economic growth across countries. I estimate a
Markov regime switching regression for panel data on economic growth. I compare
the results of employing a static measure of economic institutions as the sole
explanatory variable for the transition probability matrix, with employing
time-varying measures of institutions and human capital accumulation as
explanatory variables. I find that time-varying measures of institutions yield an
improvement in fit over static measures. Furthermore, in allowing economic and
political institutions as well as human capital accumulation to affect transitions
between growth regimes, I find that all three significantly affect such transitions.
Thus, while political institutions and human capital frequently have no significant
effect on average economic growth across countries, they do play an important role
in the dynamics of growth.
4CHAPTER II
COMMITMENT, ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONS AND
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
ILl Introduction
The causes of the 'Great Divergence' of incomes between advanced and
developing economies has been the source of much debate within the empirical
growth literature. Most of the existing studies attempt simply to explain
cross-sectional differences in income per capita, and attribute the income gap largely
to differences in total factor productivity. Hall and Jones (1997) provide empirical
evidence that the levels of economic performance vary considerably across countries,
with differences persistent over time. Despite controlling for accumulation of human
and physical capital, the Solow residual still varies significantly across countries.
Beginning with the work of Alchian, Demsetz and North in the early 1970s,
economic historians have pointed to economic conditions as causes of changing
institutions and to the evolution of institutions as efficiency enhancing and thus
improving economic outcomes. What are institutions in this context? North defines
institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction." Typically, institutions are
divided into two categories - economic and political. Political institutions regulate
the limits of political power, and determine how political power changes hands.
Economic institutions determine the degree of property rights enforcement and
5govern contractual arrangements. These institutions then influence the structure of
economic incentives and thus the efficiency of resource allocation, particularly to
productive capital and labor. A lack of sufficient institutions will drive a wedge
between private and social returns to activities in an economy, resulting in
suboptimal allocations of resources.
Hall and Jones form a proxy for this wedge between private and social
returns by combining two indices ~ an index of government antidiversion policies,
and an index measuring openness to trade. Their measure of institutions is thus the
average of these two indices. There is certainly a positive correlation between this
measure and output per worker. They then propose that the quality of "social
infrastructure" or of institutions acts as a "deep variable" in determining the level
of output per worker, and thus regress logged output per worker on the measure of
social infrastructure. They find that a difference of .01 in their measure of social
infrastructure is associated with a 5% difference in output per worker. This result
would seem to be robust to instrumenting for the measure of institutions.
Institutions and their role in economic development have been the focus of a
flurry of empirical activity since Hall and Jones (1999). Acemoglu has played a
significant role in continuing to emphasize the importance of institutions, and AJR
(2001) points to the persistence of institutions as the primal cause of long-run
economic growth, a conclusion which is supported by a number of other
cross-country studies. Jeffrey Sachs has written, along with co-authors, a series of
empirical papers, pointing to the direct effects of geographical factors, including the
role of disease burden in diminishing economic growth, on divergence of income
between countries. Glaeser et al (2004), following the argument of Lipset (1960),
provides evidence to cast doubt on the conclusions of Acemoglu and others, and
proposes instead that both political and economic institutions may be the
6consequence of development, and especially of human capital accumulation.
However, Glaeser does not presume to say that his study provides well-founded
evidence in favor of Lipset's perspective, and one interpretation of his work may
simply be that empirical specifications which rely exclusively on the identification of
deep variables (such as institutional and geographical measures) to the exclusion of
physical and human capital may be inadequate to accurately describe the political
and economic processes of development.
The existing theoretical literature is similarly lacking in a unified approach
to the subject. The first definitive research efforts in this area, including Grossman
and Kim (1996) and Tornell(1997), considered security of property rights without
exclusively modeling institutions. Economies are considered in a kind of Hobbesian
state of nature, where there is no explicit role of government, and where security is
determined through competition between interest groups. Zak (2002) introduced
expropriation, and security expenditures by the government, into an
overlapping-generations model, where the rate of expropriation was dependent on
both criminal effort and on security expenditures. Institutions in the other papers
presented here were primarily modeled in this fashion, where government
expenditures in each period directly influence the likelihood of theft. Gradstein
(2004) as well as Hoff and Stiglitz (2002) allow for discrete states of such
institutions, requiring either sufficient political constituency or tax revenues to move
from one to the other.
Current empirical work, including the studies referred to above, frequently
assume that institutions persist. Institutional transitions are sometimes
implemented as the deliberate outcome of bargaining among a small number of elite
groups, or because of changes in the balance of power between the elite and
ordinary citizens. Following this line of thought, more recent work by Acemoglu and
7Robinson (2007) considers a model in which economic institutions are determined
by the combination of de facto political power and a stochastic process.
Alternatively, institutional change may either take place either as a decentralized
process by which changes in practice occur informally among large groups of agents,
or as a formal process occurring through the government. This essay will focus on
the latter channel of institutional change.
The approach taken in this chapter is most similar to Zak (2002), in that
institutions are introduced to secure property, in a model where agents choose
between productive honest labor and theft of output. The government must
optimally choose the level of investment into institutions governing property rights
in order to maximize the utility of the representative household. However, I build
the model in an infinite-horizon setting, in which the level of property rights is a
continuous stock variable, thus differing from both Gradstein and Zak. This
introduces additional persistence in institutions, or property protection, and makes a
key distinction between current government policies and institutions. Furthermore,
in considering the dyanamic optimization problem of the government in choosing
investment in the legal infrastructure which protects property rights, I analyze both
equilibria that are attainable when the government can commit to a sequence of
policies, and those that occur when policy is set by discretion in each period.
When the government is in fact capable of committing to policy, in order to
calculate the optimal level of investment in property rights each period, I must solve
an optimization problem that is quite similar in nature to that presented in the
optimal taxation literature. In solving the model therefore, I will rely extensively on
the methods developed in this literature, and in particular that proposed by Chari
et al (1991, 1994). Furthermore, I compare the results in terms of household welfare
in the steady state when policy is set under commitment and under discretion, when
8the policymaker cannot commit to a sequence of policies. In contrast to the existing
literature, which largely considers property rights to be either a discrete variable, or
a flow variable, not a continuous stock variable, I find that under commitment there
is a single feasible steady state. Multiple steady states only exist when discretionary
policy is employed.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section (II.2) reviews the optimal fiscal
policy literature. Section (II.3) is devoted to the key assumptions of the model.
Section (II.4) sets up the government's optimal policy problem under commitment,
using the approach discussed in Chari et al (1994). Section (II.5) proposes an
alternative approach in which a steady state may more easily defined, following
Benigno and Woodford (2006). Section (II.6) characterizes the steady state under
commitment. Section (II.7) sets up the policy problem and analyzes the steady
states under discretionary policy. Section (II.8) compares the results under
discretion and commitment. Finally, Section (11.9) concludes.
11.2 Literature Review: Optimal Fiscal Policy
The model presented in this chapter is, in some sense, a variant of the
traditional dynamic optimal taxation problem called a Ramsey problem, with a
corresponding solution called a Ramsey plan. In the Ramsey problem, a benevolent
government attempts to maximize households' welfare subject to raising revenues
via distortionary taxation. Government spending is typically taken as exogenous. In
designing optimal tax policies, the government must consider the equilibrium
reactions of households and firms to policies. As a benchmark, let us consider this
problem when there exists a technology permitting the government to commit to a
policy at some initial period for all time. Lucas and Stokey (1983) analyze this form
9of the problem in a stochastic framework without physical capital. Optimal taxes
are determined by decentralizing the following problem: the government maximizes
lifetime utility of the representative household across time and across states, subject
to a feasibility or resource constraint, and subject to a constraint which I will refer
to henceforth as an implementation constraint, following the nomenclature of Chari
et al (1991). This implementation constraint is obtained by combining the
household budget constraint with its own first order conditions, as well as the
market price for labor. Imbedded in the latter two constraints are all necessary
conditions for the resulting allocation to maximize household welfare. They
therefore provide a complete description of the set of competitive equilibrium
allocations attainable through feasible policies.
The above process for determining the Ramsey equilibrium expresses
allocations as functions of A, the Lagrangian multiplier on the implementation
constraint. In addition, as shown by Chari et al (1991 and 1994), the first order
conditions for the optimal allocations are different in the initial period (when
policies are committed to for all future periods) than in subsequent periods. To
make this issue clearer, let us consider a non-stochastic version of the optimal policy
problem from Chari et al (1994).1 The government aims to set policy, to satisfy their
own budget constraint, given an exogenous sequence of government spending gt,and
to maximize the discounted lifetime utility of the representative household, where
period utility is increasing in consumption Ct and decreasing in labor supply It.
1My dating conventions differ slightly from Chari et al. That is, I refer to capital purchased in
period t for use in period t + 1 as kt+l. This is to make the notation here consistent with that in
later sections of this chapter. I also note that lower-case variables indicate per capita variables
10
The policy optimization problem is given by
00
(11.1 )
subject to
and
L ,et[Ue,tCt + Ul,tlt] = Ue,O [Rk,oko+ Rb,obo]
t
(II.2)
(II.3)
where Rk,t = 1 + (1 - cPk,t)(rt - 6k) is the gross return on capital in period t and Rb,t
is the gross return to the one-period risk-free bonds issued by the government in the
previous period. cPl,t is the tax rate on wages and cPk,t is the tax rate on income from
capital.
Equation (II.2) is simply a resource constraint, and may also be obtained by
combining the household and government budget constraints with the rental rates
on capital and labor. Equation (II.3), referred to by Chari et al (1994) as an
implementation constraint, is a necessary constraint to assure that the allocation
that solves the above optimization problem is also a solution to the household's
optimization problem, given the tax rates on capital and labor income. To see this,
I observe that the household's budget constraint is given by
(II.4)
Now I premultiply the household budget constraint by 'l/Jt, the Lagrangian multiplier
on the budget constraint in the household optimization problem, and sum over all
11
periods. The Euler equations for capital and bonds imply that
(II.5)
(II.6)
These are accompanied by the corresponding transversality conditions
(II. 7)
(II.8)
Equations (II.5-II.8) can then be used to eliminate capital and bonds for every
period except for t = 0, and I obtain
00
L{3t'l/Jt(Ct - (1 - cPlt)lt) = 'l/Jo(Rk,oko+ Rb,obo
t=O
(II.9)
The household first order conditions with respect to consumption and labor
supply imply
Uc,t = 'l/Jt
-(1 _ cPlt)Wt = UI(Ct, It)
uc ( Ct, It)
Combining equations (II. 9-11.11), I can obtain the implementation constraint,
equation (II.3).
(II.10)
(II.ll)
We note that initial marginal utility of consumption (Uc,o) is included
explicitly in the right-hand side of the implementation constraint, in the expression
for the value of the initial capital and bond holdings. The initial consumption
allocation thus plays a slightly different role in the government's problem, leading to
12
the two sets of first-order conditions. A series of papers by Pierpaolo Benigno and
Michael Woodford, in particular Benigno and Woodford (2006) show that the policy
problem defined by Chari et al is equivalent to a two-stage problem. In the
two-stage problem, I define
Wo = L/F[uc,TCT + UI,TlT]
T
(II.12)
where Wo is the value (in units of marginal utility) of the initial asset holdings of
the representative household. In the first stage of the problem, the allocations
(co, lo, kl ) as well as a commitment WI are chosen, given exogenously determined
capital income tax rate and rate of return on bonds for the initial period. In the
second stage,allocations would be chosen to maximize lifetime utility
Ut = LT j3T-tU(CT, IT), subject to a resource constraint and the commitment chosen
in the previous period. The second stage may be rewritten as a recursive problem,
and thus allows us to more easily define a steady state.
II.3 The Model
The economy consists of a large number of individuals and firms. Individuals
inelastically supply labor and capital to firms, and both purchase and appropriate
output from them. The proportion of working hours spent in appropriation is
(1 - CTt). In choosing the portion of their time spent in appropriation of output,
individuals must consider the extent of protection of property rights via the legal
system. We capture the extent of property rights protection by a variable Pt that I
call legal infrastructure. Legal infrastructure refers to the system of laws, as well as
the physical and human capital invested in the judicial and legal enforcement
systems. Pt is a continuous stock variable, to capture small improvements in laws
13
and the quality of courts and of legal enforcement over time, as well as persistence
of practices within the legal system.
Effective labor is equal to the product of the size of the labor force and the
proportion of time each worker spends in productive activities. A
constant-returns-to-scale technology is available to transform effective labor (JtLt
and capital Kt into output via the production function F(Kt, (JtLt). The output can
be used either for private consumption Ct1 new capital K t+1 , or for new legal
infrastructure, Pt+1, which serves to improve protection of output produced by
firms. Feasibility requires that
(II.13)
where 6k is the depreciation rate on capital, and 6p is the depreciation rate on legal
infrastructure. Investment in legal infrastructure is financed by proportional taxes
on wages and capital income and by bonds. Let cPu denote the tax rate on labor
income, and cPkt the tax rate on capital income. Let Bt+l denote the debt issued in
period t and Rb,t+lBt+l denote the debt service payment in the subsequent period.
Constant returns to scale implies that I may consider the following
transformation of the aggregate production function
(11.14)
where kt = 1:. If I assume a constant, exogenous population growth rate of n, then
the feasibility constraint may be written in per capita terms
(II.15)
14
where, as previously stated, the lower case refers to per capita variables.
Now I consider the behavior of households and firms, and then proceed to
specify the optimization problem of policymakers in the Ramsey problem.
II. 3.1 Hov,seholds
My preference structure is standard. I assume that there are many identical
consumers, each of whom maximizes the discounted expression for utility,
(Xl
(II.16)
In each period, while consumers supply labor and capital inelastically, they may
choose both their level of consumption, Ct, and the proportion of their time they
wish to devote to honest, productive activities. The remainder of their labor time
they will spend in appropriating output from the firm. Their labor income consists
of wage income, Wt, and appropriation income 7(1 - (Jt), where (Jt is the proportion
of their time allocated to productive activities, 7 is the rate of return to
appropriation. In each period, households face some probability that they will be
caught by the government in the act of appropriation. If they are caught, all their
labor income, including any appropriated output, will be forfeited to the firm. With
probability h(pt, (Jt) they will retain all their income. Only "legal" income is taxed.
The budget constraint for period t is thus given by
h(pt, (Jt) . ((1 - cPlt)Wt + 7(1 - (Jt)) + (1 + (1 - cPkt)(rt - 6k))kt + Rb,tbt
2: Ct + (1 + n)kt+1 + (1 + n)bt+1 (11.17)
15
Here, I treat each household as a continuum of agents, so that each
household receives the expected value of labor income from each agent. This avoids
issues of risk which are tangential to the focus of this chapter. I make the following
simplifying assumptions. First, the utility function is strictly concave and satisfies
the 1nada conditions. Second, the probability function h(pt, ert) behaves as follows:
h(pt, ert) E [0, 1] Vert,Pt (II.18a)
lim h(pt, ert) = 1 Vert, Pt (11. 18b)Pt--->Q
lim h(pt, ert) = 0 for ert < 1 (11.18c)Pt--->OO
lim h(pt, ert) = 1 VPt (II.18d)
at--->l
lim h(pt, erd = 0 VPt (11. 18e)
at--->Q
ha,t 2: 0 Vert, Pt (II. 18f)
hp,t :::; 0 Vert, Pt (II. 18g)
lim hat = 0 (II.18h)
at--->l '
These conditions are sufficient to impose interior solutions on Ct and ert. I note for
the reassurance of the reader that the set of functions satisfying equations
(II.18a-11.18h) is non-null. Later in the chapter, I will employ the specific functional
form:
1
h(p, er) = 1 + ~p'Y(l _ er)'Y (II.19)
For now, however, I shall continue with the general form h(p, er). The household
first-order conditions are then given by a static condition,
(11.20)
16
the Euler equation for physical capital,
(II.21)
and the Euler equation for bonds
(II.22)
Equations (II.21) and (II.22) are conventional Euler equations with respect to
capital and bonds respectively. In equation (II.20) the household is simply equating
the marginal cost and benefit from an increase in the time spent productively, Clt.
ha ,t((l - ¢It)Wt + 7(1 - Clt)) gives the marginal benefit of Cl in the form of increased
retained income. h(pt, Clt)7 gives the marginal cost, in the form of reduced income
from appropriation.
II.3.2 Firms
Perfectly competitive markets imply that firms take rental rates of labor and
capital, as well as the return on appropriation, as given. Since firms are not able to
observe the appropriation of output by workers, the representative firm maximizes
in each period the expected value of its profit
(II.23)
where 5 t is the firm's expectation of the proportion of time workers will devote to
productive activities. In equilibrium this will be equal to Clt.
17
The return to capital and labor thus equal their marginal products, namely
(11.24)
(II.25)
II. 3. 3 Competitive Equilibrium
In order to fully specify the competitive equilibrium, I must describe the
income and expenditure of the government. I assume that the government can
borrow by issuing a one-period risk-free real bond. Per capita government debt
evolves according to the law of motion
where Po, bo, ko are given, as are cPk,O and Rb,o, Our first objective is to understand
the behavior of the economy under exogenously given sequences of policies,
{Pt, cPl,t, cPk,t}~O, The economy will be fully characterized by this sequence of
policies, the household budget constraint (II1.22),the household first-order
conditions (II.20-II.22), the rental rates (II.24), and the law of motion of
government debt (11.26). The household budget constraint, the government budget
constraint and the rental rates may be combined to obtain a resource constraint,
which, following Chari et aI, I will refer to as a feasibility constraint. Consider now
the steady state equilibrium, given by c, (J, k, b and the policy variables P, cPl, cPk' Rb.
This steady state is characterized by the following set of first-order conditions and
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the feasibility constraint:
CJf (~) = (n + Ok)k + (n + Op)p + c
h. ((1 -,jJ,) ()"f (~~;,:rmH17(1 - ()")) ~ h(p, ()")7
(1 + n) = (3 (1 + (1 - ¢k) (f (~) -Ok) )
(II.27)
(II.28)
(11.29)
The Euler equation for bonds implies that b = 0 or Rb = (1 + n)/(3. So that
this steady state is feasible, I require that the policy variables are such that the
government budget constraint is satisfied. The Euler equation for bonds implies
that the following constraint must hold:
(
(3 - 1)(l+n) -(3- b = (n + Op)p - ¢Wf (~) + (¢l - ¢k)kf (~)
+¢lh(p, CJ)r(1 - CJ) + ¢kOkk (II. 30)
From the Euler equation for capital, equation (II.29), I find that k and CJ are
linearly related, or that k = BCJ, where I define
(II.31 )
As a result, I may eliminate c and k from the steady state equations (I1.27-II.29).
We are left with one key equation in CJ and the policy variables:
(II.32)
One can show under optimal policy that ¢k = 0, and that Rb = (1 + n)/(3. In this
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case, using equation (11.30), equation (II.32) may be rewritten as
(II.33)
This equation completely determines the steady state of the economy in the case of
exogenous b, p where rPl is chosen to satisfy the government budget constraint. We
can now employ the assumptions made about the probability function h(p, (J) to
more fully characterize the steady state(s). These assumptions imply the following
limiting behavior of the left-hand side of equation (11.33)
(II.34)
(II.35)
However, W= (J j(B) - B(J j'(B), and under optimal policy rPk = 0 so that
investment in p is wholly funded through taxes on wages. Since I impose that rPl ::::; 1
then (J j(B) - B(J j'(B) - h(p, (J)T(l - (J) 2:: (n + op)p + (l+n~l-,6). It may be shown
that while equation (11.33) generally admits two solutions, the lower solution implies
that rPl > 1.
As h(p, (J) is increasing in (J, the right-hand side of the equation will be
increasing in (J for all values of (J. This would imply the possibility of two steady
states of (J for a given value of p. In the case where lima--->o ha = 0 the lower steady
state would occur at (J = O. Otherwise, there will generally be two steady states
such that (J > 0 for a given value of p. The plot in figure (11.1) is generated for the
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Fig. II.1: Plot of values of left-hand/right-hand sides of equation(IL33)for p = 2. The
dashed line indicates the value of the left-hand side as a is varied, while the solid line
indicates the value of the right-hand side.
case b = 0, assuming the functional forms
h(p, a) 1
1 + ~pl'(l - a)1'
(~)a
and the parameter values presented in table(II.1). We can observe in figure (11.1)
the existence of two solutions to equation (II.33), but as argued above, only the
upper steady state will satisfy the restriction that cPl ~ 1.
a 1/3
n 0.03
,8 0.98
Ok 0.1
Op 0.1
e 1
'"Y 2
T 0.5
Tab. II.1: Baseline values of key parameters.
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In order to satisfy our assumptions regarding its behavior, h(p, 0") must have
the property that ha is initially increasing in 0" for low values of 0", but that for high
values of 0", ha is decreasing. In particular, there will exist a 0"* for which ha is
maximized. The value 0"* will be increasing in p. The marginal effect of 0" on
retained income will thus attain a peak and then start to decline as 0" approaches
unity. As property rights improve, or p increases, the peak will be attained for a
higher value of 0". (Figure 11.2) The behavior of the expected return to
appropriation, h(p, 0")7 is much simpler, as it is simply monotonically increasing in
0" and decreasing in p. From the previous arguments with regard to the behavior of
the marginal effect of 0" on retained labor income, and the return to appropriation, I
may conclude that the solution for 0" will be increasing in p. From the household's
perspective, taking wages as given, an increase in property rights will tend to reduce
the relative return in appropriation, resulting in a lower fraction of time spent in
appropriation. An increase in 7 will increase the upper solution for 0", the only
feasible solution. This can be seen by implicitly differentiating 0" with respect to 7
in equation (I1.33)to obtain
dO" h(p,O")
d7 haa(O"f(B) - Bf'(B)O" - (n + 6p )p - (Rb - (1 + n))b) + ha(j(B) - Bf'(B) - 7)
For high values of 0", haa < 0, which can result in dO"/d7 < 0.
Consumption in the steady state can be directly determined from the
resource constraint, given p and the level of time spent in appropriation 0"
If social welfare is measured by the lifetime utility of the representative household in
10.8
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/
/
/
/
/
- - p=2
-- p=4
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Fig. 11.2: Marginal effect of increase in (J on retained labor income
the steady-state, it will be given by
1
U = -(3u(c)1-
If the utility function is monotonically increasing in consumption, then an analysis
of the variation of household welfare in the steady state will be equivalent to the
variation of steady-state consumption. The effect of an improvement of legal
infrastructure on steady-state consumption or
(11.36)
will depend on how (J responds to an increase in p. It will be highly responsive to
increases in legal infrastructure when p is low, but not for relatively high values of p.
This is due to the fact (J will rapidly approach the upper limit of (J = 1, where
heY = 0, regardless of the value of p. As a result, in the steady state, consumption
will be maximized for a relatively low level of p.
As the return to appropriation T increases, households will choose to allocate
more time to appropriation, reducing (J for a given level of p. Now address the
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responsiveness of p to (J. Differentiate (II.33) with respect to p to obtain:
d(J hpT + (n + op)ha - hap ((Jf(B) - (JBj'(B) - (n + Op)p - (l+n~l-/3)b)
dp ha(f(B) - B P(B)) + haa ((J f(B) - BP(B)(J - (n + Op)p - (l+n~l-/3) b)
The denominator of the expression will be positive for all values of (J except when (J
is sufficiently close to °or 1, so that
As a result, except for the case where (J is either sufficiently small or large, d(J / dp
declines as T increases. In the latter cases, an increase in the return to
appropriation will increase d(J / dp. The increased sensitivity of (J to p at lower levels
of legal infrastructure in the case of high return to appropriation will imply a higher
level of p for which steady-state consumption is maximized, which one can observe
in figure (II.3). Let us define p* as the value of p for which c will be maximized for a
given value of T. Similarly, define c* = maxp c(p, T).
dc* dp*
dT = cp dT + CT
At c*, cp = 0, so that dc* /dT = dc(p, T)/dT. The function c(p, T) will be declining in
the second argument, since (J declines as T increases, causing income will be
reduced. As a result, c* will be decreasing in T.
While the preceding analysis is certainly intuitive, and allows us to
characterize the effect of policy on the steady state, it does not allow us to
determine optimal policy, which is set in a dynamic framework. To find optimal
steady state levels of p, I must solve the Ramsey problem.
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Fig. 11.3: Effect of T on steady state values of C,CT for b = 0
II.4 The Ramsey Problem
Consider now the problem faced by the government in setting optimal policy.
For simplicity, I assume that there is an institution through which the government
can bind itself to a particular sequence of policies. Since policies need to account for
consumer and firm responses to policies, allocations and rental rates on labor and
capital will be given by sequences of functions that associate allocations and prices
with policies.
Definition II.I. A Ramsey equilibrium is a policy {PHI, bHI , cPI,t, cPk,t, Rb,t}~to' an
allocation rule {c(.), k(·), CT(')} and price rules w(·), and r{) such that
1. The policy maximizes the discounted lifetime utility of the representative
household (II.16) ,subject to the government budget constraint (II.26), where
allocations and rental rates are given by the rules defined above.
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11. For every policy, the corresponding allocation and rental rates will maximize
(II.16), subject to the household budget constraint (II1.22).
iii. For every policy, the rental rates satisfy the profit-maximizing conditions
given by (11.24) and (11.25).
Proposition ILL The allocations of consumption, physical capital and time spent
in appropriation in a Ramsey equilibrium solve the Ramsey allocation problem
subject to the following constmints:
~. Resource constmint
~~. Implementation constmint
(II.37)
(11.38)
where Rb,o and cPkO are taken as given. 2
Proof. In section (11.3.3), I showed that by combining the household budget
constraint, the government budget constraint, and the competitive rental rates of
labor and capital, I obtained the feasibility condition (II.38). Multiplying the
2This assumption is to avoid the typical result of the Ramsey problem that the government will
have the incentive to set the initial tax rate on capital as large as possible.
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household budget constraint (IlI.22) by 1/Jt, summing over t
~{3t'l/)t[h(Pt, (Jt)((l - ¢It)Wt + 7(1 - (Jt)) + (1 + (1 - ¢kt)(rt - 6k))kt + Rb,tbt
t
- Ct - (1 + n)kt+1 - (1 + n)bt+lJ = 0 (lIAO)
The Euler equations for capital and bands
(lI.41)
(11.42)
and the corresponding transversality conditions may be used to eliminate to
eliminate capital and bonds, with the exception of t = O. Combining equations
(lIAO-lIA2), and slightly rearranging, I may obtain
~{3t1/Jt(Ct - h(pt, (Jt)((1- ¢It)Wt + 7(1 - (Jt)))
t
= 1/Jo(Rb,obo+ (1 + (1 - ¢kO)(rO - Jk))ko) (11.43)
The first-order condition for consumption implies that U c t = 1/Jt. The first order, ,
condition with respect to (Jt may then be used to obtain Wt in terms of (Jt and Pt.
Equation (11.43) may thus be transformed into the implementation constraint
(lI.39). Thus, equations (lI.38) and (lI.39) are necessary conditions that any
Ramsey equilibrium must satisfy.
Now, given any allocation that satisfies (lI.38) and (11.39), I may construct
sequences of bond holdings and policies such that these allocations satisfy the
first-order conditions of the household's optimization problem. An allocation
{Ct, (Jt, kt+l, Pt+l}:O will determine the rental rates of labor and capital, according
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to:
f' (kt )
O"t
kt I kt(O"tf(-) - ktf (-))
O"t O"t
(II.44)
(II.45)
To construct the bond allocations, multiply the household budget constraint (III.22)
by'IjJt and sum overall periods following r. Slightly rearranging, I obtain
00I: ,et'IjJt[(l + (1 - ¢kt)(rt - 6k))kt - (1 + n)kH1 + Rb,tbt - (1 + n)bt+l]
t=r+l
00
= I: ,et'IjJt[Ct - h(pt, O"t)((1- ¢It)Wt + 7(1 - O"t))] (11.46)
t=r+l
Following the same steps as I used in deriving the implementation constraint, in
particular, employing the Euler equations for capital and bonds, equation (II.46
may be transformed to
13'+1 ";,.+,[(1+(1- ¢k,,+J )(r'+1 -6k) l!;.+1 +Rb,'+lb,+,[ ~ t~1 iJt,,;, [c, - T (h(P~::t)1']
(II.47)
But the household first order condition with respect to capital and bonds implies
that
(1 + n),er'IjJr(br+1 + kr+1) = ,er+l'IjJr+dRb,r+lbr+l + (1 + (1 - ¢k,r+l) (rr+l - 6k))kr+1]
(II.48)
As a result, I obtain
(II.49)
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Or bonds issued in period r are given by
00 'u (c - Jh(Pt, CTt»2 T)~ e,t t h t
br+1 = 6 f3t-r (1 + n)u""'
t=r+l e~
(II.50)
The method of construction of the bond allocations implies that the household
first-order conditions and budget constraint will be satisfied, provided that the
return to bonds is given by
for periods in which bt > O.
(II.51)
o
The Lagrangian for the Ramsey problem can thus be written as
2' = ~ f3' (U(ct) + 't,(<Td (~:) + (1 - 6k )k, + (1 - 6p )p, - (l-t-n) (k'+l +P,+l) - ct)
_ AUe,t (Ct _ (h(P~:~t) )2 T) )
+ AUe,O ( Rb,obo+ (1 + (1 - ¢kO) (f' (::) - 15k ) ) kO) (II.52)
'l/Jt is the time-varying Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint, as opposed
to 'l/Jt, the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint in the household's
optimization problem. A is the multiplier on the implementation constraint (II.39),
and is thus constant over time. The first order conditions for this problem imply
that for t 2: 1 the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint may be given by
(II.53)
Were the implementation constraint not binding, then A = 0, and the Lagrange
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multiplier on the feasibility constraint would simply equal the marginal utility of
consumption at the optimum, a familiar result from the household optimization
problem. When the implementation constraint binds, then the expression must
include a correction term, equal to the marginal effect of an increase in Ct on the
value of the implementation constraint. This captures the necessity for policy to be
set so that the household attains its optimal allocation. In particular, the
allocations in Ct, kt+l' CTt+l obtained as solutions to the Ramsey problem, will be
solutions to the household's optimization problem, under the policies Pt, rPk,t, rPl,t
corresponding to the Ramsey equilibrium. Having obtained 'l/Jt, the following static
condition must hold
along with two dynamic equations, the first order conditions with respect to capital
and property rights respectively
(II.55)
(II.56)
For t = 0, the Lagrangian multiplier on the feasibility constraint will be given
by
{Jo = uc,o - A ( uc,o + ucc,o (co _ T (h(P~:,:o) )2) )
+ AUcc,o ( Rb,obo+ (1 + (1- rPk,O) (f' (::) -Ok) ) kO) (11.57)
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The following first order condition with respect to 0"0 must also hold:
- ( (ko) ko I (kO)) ( ( h(Po, 0"0) ) 2 )1/Jo f 0"0 - 0"0 f 0"0 + AUc,OT 2h(po, 0"0) - ha,o haa,o
- '\",,0(1 - <pk,O) C~) 2 1" C~) = 0 (1158)
The first order conditions with respect to capital and property rights for t=O will be
identical in form to those for t ;:::: 1.
11.5 An Alternative Approach to the Ramsey Equilibrium
The approach taken by Chari et al has the property that the policy problem
is not recursive, and in particular, that the first-order conditions in the initial period
differ from those in subsequent periods. Let us now consider an alternative
approach, advocated by Benigno and Woodford (2006), which has the technical
advantage of making the optimal policy stationary. To proceed I slightly alter the
set of initial conditions. That is, rather than taking the initial tax rate on capital as
given, I instead assume that there is a pre-existing commitment with regard to the
value of initial household assets.
Definition 11.2. The value of consumption net of wage income over periods T ;:::: t
is given by
TXT _ ~ f.lT-t ( (h(PT, O"T) )2 )
vv t = 6 jJ Uc,T CT - h T
T=t a,T
(11.59)
W t is defined to be the pre-existing commitment regarding the value of household
assets in period t.
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Proposition II.2. Given {kto,ptolbto, W to }, consider the sequential optimization
problem in which {Xt} = {Ct, O"t, kH I, PHI, WH d are chosen for each period t 2: to to
maximize the function J(Xtl W HI ), subject to the feasibility constraint (II.38) and
(II.60)
given the values for {kt ,Pt, W t } determined in the previous period. The function
J (.) is defined by:
where V(kH11 Pt+l, Wt+l) denotes the maximum attainable value of
00
Ut = L (3T-t U ( CT )
T=t
(II.61)
(II.62)
subject to the feasibility and implementation constraints mentioned above. The
allocation chosen in this manner will maximize the lifetime utility of households
subject to the feasibility constraint (II.38) and the implementation constraint
W to = W to '
Proof. Consider the Ramsey problem:
00
max L (3t-to u (Ct)
t~to
(II.63)
subject to (II.38) and W to = W to , given {kto,pto}' We now proceed by comparing
the allocations chosen as the solution to the above problem to the outcome of a
2-stage problem. In the first stage of this problem, choose {Xto' W to+l } to maximize
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J(Xto, W to +1 ) such that the feasibility constraint holds and
W ( (h(Pto,o-to))2) fJWto = Uc,to Cta - I T + to+l/'(J,to (II. 54)
In the second stage, {Xt} is chosen to maximize Uto+1 given the feasibility constraint
and W to+1 = W to+1' We note that the solution of this two-stage problem is feasible
as a Ramsey equilibrium, in that it satisfies the feasibility and implementation
constraints. Clearly, both the first and second stage satisfy feasibility. Then, I can
substitute W to +1 = W to+1 into equation (II.54), to obtain W to = WtD" It then
remains only to show that there cannot be any other sequence of allocations {Xt}
that satisfies the constraints of the Ramsey problem and attains a higher level of
utility Uto' Suppose that there does exist such a {Xt}, and let Wto+1 be the implied
value for W to+1, Uto-n the implied forward-looking utility in period to + 1 from the
sequence of allocations, and Uto the implied value of Uto. By hypothesis Uto > Uto'
We note that {xt} satisfies the constraints of the first-stage problem. Because the
allocation is fea.c;ible and is consistent by construction with the precommitment
Wto+1, I must have
(II. 55)
Since the allocation also satisfies the constraints of the first-stage problem, then
(11.66)
We must then conclude that
(II.67)
which contracts the assumption that {Xt} solved the first-stage optimization. This
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contradiction implies that {Xt} represents a Ramsey equilibrium. Furthermore, the
second-stage problem as described here is of the same form as the Ramsey problem
The same proof can be used to show that it is equivalent to a similar two-stage
problem. By induction, I may establish that (Xt, Wt+d solve a similar "first-stage"
problem to that described in this proof. The proposition follows. o
A similar approach may be used to show that the policy problem as
originally defined (with a constraint on the capital tax rate, rather than on the
value of initial assets) is also equivalent to a two-stage problem. In the first stage,
(Cto,(Tto,kto+l,Pto+l) and W to+1 are chosen, given the initial capital tax rate and the
initial levels of capital and bonds. For t 2 to, policy is chosen to maximize Uto+1
subject to the feasibility constraint and Wto+1 = W to+1' Proposition (II.2) implies
that the second stage of this problem is characterized by stationary optimal policies,
for which I can define a steady state equilibrium.
11.6 Steady State under Optimal Policy with Commitment
Finding the steady state will correspond to finding, for an initial level of debt
b, the initial commitment Wand initial levels of physical capital and legal
infrastructure (k, p) such that the optimal sequence of allocations is a constant
allocation and set of policies {c, (T, k,p, b, rPk' rPz, W}, where b, k, Ware identical to
the initial conditions.
Rewriting the optimization problem as a Lagrangian, I find
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The first-order conditions with respect to Ct, at are then given by
These are accompanied by two Euler-like equations, for kt+I and PHI
respectively:
(II. 71)
In a steady-state solution, these conditions reduce to the following system of
equations:
(1 - A)Uc -1jJ - AUcc (C - (h(~(Ja))2T) = 0
,j; (1 (~) -~f' (~)) + AT1;, (Zh(P, ,,) - C't1) '"..) ~ 0
and
1+ n = jJ (1 -6k + l' (~) )
1/;(1+ n - fJ(l- 8p)) = fiTAU, (Zh(P, ,,) ~: - Ch(~~"))rhop)
(II.73)
(II.74)
(II.75)
(II.76)
Equation (II.75) and the household first order condition for capital (II.29)
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imply together that the tax rate on capital will be equal to zero in the steady state.
Equations (II. 73)-(II. 76) together with the steady versions of the feasibility and
implementation constraint and a constraint on W to make the commitment feasible
(II. 77)
(II.78)
(II.79)
form a system of equations which determine the steady state. The steady state tax
rate on wages is determined by combining the household first order condition for (J
with the market wage rate to obtain
(II.80)
The following budget constraint gives the relationship between cPl and b
The law of motion for government debt, equation (II.26), implies that b will
determined by the history of the economy prior to convergence to the steady state.
The steady state allocation, c, (J, k, p will depend on b, and thus is
history-dependent. In order to obtain numerical results for the steady state under
full commitment, I consider the case of log utility. In my initial analysis, I assip,;n to
the parameters 0'., n, 13, 15k , 15p , 0, I the values listed in Table II.1.
In section lIlA, I considered the effect of p, taken at that point to be
exogenous, on steady-state consumption and time spent in appropriation, (J. To
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more clearly compare the results under exogenous policy to steady state
consumption in the Ramsey equilibrium, let us define c(p) as the steady state
consumption as a function of legal infrastructure p, where cPk = aand b = O.
Furthermore, let c* = maxp c(p) , and let Cr denote the steady state value of
consumption in the Ramsey equilibrium. Suppose that u(cr ) > u(c*). By the
definition, the steady state allocation of the Ramsey equilibrium satisfies the
household FOCs given policies p, cPl' cPk' Therefore, c* violates its own definition. We
can therefore state that u(c*) ~ u(cr ). Furthermore, c*, and corresponding O"*,p*, k*
must satisfy the steady-state versions of the implementation and feasibility
constraint, since these are derived from the household first order conditions. As a
result, I can use the solution to the following maximization problem to find c*
given the steady state Euler equation, which implies k = BO". The first order
conditions of this problem with respect to c and 0" are identical to those obtained for
the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. The FOC with respect to p is given by
( ) ( ( )
hp (h(P, 0")) 2 )
'ljJ n+op = AUcT 2h P,O" h
u
- h
u
hup (II.83)
which is identical in form to equation (II. 76), and is identical to equation (II.76) for
f3 = 1. Thus, as f3 approaches 1, Cr approaches c*.
We saw in our analysis of the steady state with exogenous policy, that while
there were in general two potential solutions to the first order condition for 0", the
lower value of 0" implied a value of cPl which was not feasible, i.e. cPl ~ 1. In my
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numerical analysis, I found that for a given value of r there was a single value of p
that maximized steady-state consumption. One could use these results to argue for
the existence of a unique steady state under policy with commitment. Alternatively,
I may reduce the equations (II.73 - II. 76) to a two-dimensional system in 0" and p,
given by
(f(B) - Bj'(B)) ((1 - )..(p, O"))uc(p, 0") - )..(p, O")ucc(p, 0") (c(p, 0") _ r (h(~:))2) )
+ ),(p, ")TU,(p, ,,) (2h(P,") - Ct"))' h•• ) = 0 (II.84a)
and
(II.84b)
First, consider the behavior of equation (II.84b), which is simply the
implementation constraint in the steady state. From the Euler equation, k = BO",
implying that the left-hand side is linear and increasing in 0", and independent of p.
On the left-hand side, consumption will be linear in both 0" and p. Income from
labor, given by r(h(p, O")? fha, is increasing in 0", decreasing in p and has the
following limiting behavior
lim (h(p,O")? = 0
a-->O ha
lim (h(p,0"))2 = 00
a-->l ha
(II.85)
(II.86)
As a result, there is a unique value of 0" for which c - r(h(p, O")? /ha is maximized.
Since for 0" close to both 0 and 1, consumption net of labor income will be negative.
There will thus be at most 2 solutions to equation (II.84b)with the case of no
solutions occurring for p sufficiently low or high. For the moment, let us refer to
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these two solutions as O"l (p, b) and O"h (p, b). An increase in p, i.e. in the capital
invested in legal infrastructure, will lower steady steady-state consumption for every
value of 0", and will similarly lower labor income. The value of the right-hand side of
equation (I1.84b) will decline for every value of 0". Consequently, both O"l and O"h will
be increasing in p.
The behavior of equation (I1.84a) is more complicated, and the reasoning is
considerably less straightforward. However, numerical analysis shows that for a
range of parameter values, and in particular, for a range of values of T, there are at
most 2 solutions in 0" to the equation, where the upper solution is decreasing in p
and the lower solution is increasing in p. In particular, when the capital invested in
the legal infrastructure approaches 0, the lower solution will approach 0 and the
upper solution will approach 1. This implies that there will be at most two solutions
to the set of equations, which one can see in figure 11.4. We refer to these two
solutions as {O"lr, Plr} and {O"hr, Phr }. In general, however, the solution {O"lr, Plr} will
in general be infeasible, requiring that cPl > 1.
1 ____
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
/ \
1 2 3 4 5 6
Fig. IlA: Possibility of multiple steady states under commitment: Solutions to the
equations (I1.84a-Il.84b) for b = 0 and T = 1. 0"11 and O"hl are the solutions to (Il.84a),
while O"l2 and O"h2 indicate the solutions to (I1.84b).
In section (IlIA), I showed that c* was decreasing in T. The dependence of
the steady state on T is entirely driven by its influence on the household's choice of
O"t. In particular, an increase in T increases the return on appropriation relative to
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wage mcome. The reduction in (J would imply a decline in steady state capital stock
and consumption. The government could in theory increase the tax rate and
improve the legal infrastructure in order to restore (J to its original level. However,
an increase in the tax rate, would also increase the relative return from
appropriation, reducing the net effect of the increase in the tax rate and in p on (J.
In addition, maintaining a higher level of p would reduce steady state consumption.
An increase in legal infrastructure will thus be optimal but (J will still decline.
c a
(a) Steady state consumption (b) Steady state (J
p c/Jl
1.25 1.5 1.750.25 0.5 0.75
(c) Steady state legal infrastructure (d) Steady state tax rate
Fig. 11.5: Effect of T on steady state of Ramsey equilibrium
II.7 Discretionary Policy
II. 7.1 Discretion as the first period of Ramsey problem
Now consider the case where the government is unable to commit to a
sequence of policies for all time. Instead, they are only able to commit one period in
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advance. Specifically, they choose the capital tax rate and the level of investment in
the legal infrastructure for the subsequent period, and then set current labor tax
rates in order to satisfy the government budget constraint. In this initial approach
to the optimal policy problem under discretion, they assume that they will be able
to commit to optimal policy in subsequent periods.
Rather than using an implementation constraint such as equation (11.39)
based on initial endowments in capital and bonds, the government uses the
following constraint in each period, to assure that the allocation found as a solution
to the discretionary policy problem is in fact a solution to the household's
optimization problem:
The derivation of this constraint is isomorphic to that for equation (II.39), with the
exception that rather than summing over all time, I am simply considering the
household's first-order conditions and budget constraint for T ~ t. The constraint
simply represents the fact that present and future consumption in excess of period
labor income must be funded by income from assets with which the representative
household begins period t. The Lagrangian for the discretionary policy problem
may thus be written
.z; ~ ~ /IT-' (,,(Or) +"zT (<TTf G~) + (1 - Ok)kd (1 - Op)PT
- (1 + n)(kT+1+PT+l) - CT) - AUc,T (CT - (h(P~~,:T))2T) )
+ AUc,t ( Rb,tbt + (1 + (1 - cPk,t) (f' (~:) - 15k) ) kt ) (II.88)
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The first order condition with respect to Ct takes the form
The first-order condition with respect to O"t can similarly be written as
(II.90)
Finally, I obtain two Euler-like equations, the first order conditions with respect to
kt+1 and PH1
(11.91)
(II.92)
By comparing the above equation with the household Euler condition, one may find
once again that the steady capital tax rate will be equal to zero. The latter
conditions may be combined with the resource constraint and equation (II.87) to
obtain the following system of equations characterizing the steady state under
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discretionary policy
VJ (I m-~f' (~)) + An', (Zh(P' iT) - Ct))' hUff)
_AUc(~)2j"(~) =0
(1 + n) = fJ (1 - 6k + !' (~))
c + (n + 6)k + (n + 6p )p = (jf (~)
(II.93a)
(II. 93b)
(II.93c)
(II.93d)
(II.93e)
(II.93f)
As in the case of commitment, I may reduce the equations characterizing the
steady state to a two-dimensional system:
( (
(h(p,0"))2(j(B) - Bf'(B)) (1- A(b,p, (j))uc(p, (j) - A(b,p, O")ucc(p, 0") c(p, (j) - T h
a
1+n)) ((h(P,0"))2 )
- j3'(b + EO") + A(p, (j)T1J,c(p, 0") 2h(p, (j) - h
a
haa
- AUc(p, (j)B2j"(E) = 0 (II.94a)
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and
(II.94b)
1 ~
~
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Fig. II.6: Possibility of multiple steady states under discretion: Solutions to the
equations (II.94a-II.94b) for b = a and T = 1. (Jll and (Jhl are the solutions to
(II.94a), while (J12 and (Jh2 indicate the solutions to (II.94b).
The behavior of the two solutions to (II.94b) is identical to that of (II.84b).
The key difference in the Ramsey problem first-order conditions under discretion
and commitment is that in the case of discretion policymakers consider the effect of
policy 011 the value of assets in every period. In determining the sequence of
allocations {CT,(JT,kT+l,PT+d~=t>the policymakers must balance dual objectives of
maximizing lifetime utility and maximizing the current value of assets in order to
relax the implementation constraint. The second objective causes the introduction
of additional terms in the FOes for Ct and (J)t. To see the intuition behind this, I
observe that an increase in Ct, while increasing current-period utility, will also lower
the marginal utility of consumption. If the current value of assets is given by
then the increase in Ct will reduce the value of these assets. Similarly, an increase in
(Jt both increases wage income, and by increasing the interest rate, increases the
current value of household assets. Under discretion, policy-makers will have an
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incentive to decrease current consumption and increase CTt, relative to their values
under commitment. In the steady state, for relatively low values of p, numerical
analysis shows that CThl will initially decrease as p increases, and in fact, will not
differ significantly from its value under commitment. However, CThl will be
increasing in p once property rights exceed a certain threshold (Figure (II.6)). This
behavior may be justified by the fact that when property rights are high, wage
income is relatively more important than income from appropriation, and the tax
base will thus be higher. It becomes less costly to set investment in legal
infrastructure and tax rates so that households spend less time in appropriation.
Under discretion, the government will have an added incentive to do so.
The above characterization of the loci of solutions to equations
(II.94a-II.94b) implies the possibility of four steady states, two with relatively low
values of CT and two with relatively high values. The lower two steady states will not
be feasible, except for very low values of T, as they would require cPz > 1. However,
the upper two steady states are indeed feasible for a broad range of values of T, the
return to appropriation.
11.7.2 Markov Perfect Equilibria
The approach to discretionary policy outlined in the previous section has the
disadvantage that it assumes that despite having perfect foresight, governments and
households will continue to assume throughout time that the government is always
in the first period of a new commitment to policy. The framework of Markov
Perfect Equilibria, as used by Klein et al (2003) and Ortigueira and Pereira (2007),
assumes that governments are conscious of their inability to commit. Instead, fiscal
policy will be chosen to maximize the lifetime utility of the representative
household, given the policy functions of the sequence of future governments.
45
c
0.4
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.250.5 0.75 1 1.251.51.75'
/
..L.-~O.~2~~5~O.~5--o0--C.7=5---c:-l----O-1.~2~57-"-1.5-1-.75 t
(a) Steady state consumption
p
7r'·k-4 . -',3 .'~~......... ,
0.250.5 0.75 1 1.251.51.75
IT
a r
w= 01
··°2
. a,
(b) Steady state (j
</>1
,
0.8 0_.-
'-0.6
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.251.5 1.75'
(c) Steady state legal infrastructure (d) Steady state tax rate
Fig. I1.7: Effect of T on steady state of equilibrium under discretionary policy. (7r
corresponds to the equilibria under commitment, while (71, (72 and (73 correspond to
the 3 possible steady states under discretionary policy
Equilibria will correspond to the identical policy function being used by current and
future governments.
The optimization problem for the government may be formalized as follows3 .
The Euler equation and the static first order condition with respect to (7, give us
expressions for the choice variables c, (7 in terms of state variables and policy
variables, namely (7 = (7(K, P, ¢l) and c = c(K, B, P, ¢l, ¢k). Given these functions,
the government's problem may be formulated in two stages. In the second stage,
given tax rates and investment in the legal infrastructure, the government will
choose the level of public debt for the subsequent period. This will give public debt
as a function of current bond holdings, the aggregate stock of physical capital and
legal infrastructure, along with tax rates. In the first step of the government's
problem, tax rates and legal infrastructure are chosen subject to the capital
3A slight change in notation is employed in this section. B, P, K all will refer to aggregate values
of variables b,p, k, while k refers to the choice of physical capital accumulation by the household
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accumulation equation, the government's budget constraint, with public debt and
household choice variables being included as functions of state variables, as
described above.
The value function for the government then becomes:
W(K, B, P) = max {U(C(K, B, P, cPl' cPk)) + jJW(K', B'(K, B, P, cPl, cPk), P'(K, B, P))}
¢1,¢k,P'
(11.95)
subject to
(1 + n)K' = u(K, P, cPl)! (U(K~, cPl)) + (1 - 6k)K + (1- 6p )P
- (1 + n)P' - C(K, B, P, cPl' cPk) (11.96)
and
(1 + n)P' = (1 - 6p )P + cPlh(P, u(K, P, cPl)) * (rJ(K~, cPz)) + cPd' (U(K~, ¢l))
+ (1 + n)B'(K, B, P, cPl' cPk) - RbB (I1.97)
The next step is to obtain what I shall refer to as generalized Euler
equations, by combining the first order conditions for the government's
maximization problem with appropriate envelope conditions. 4 The first order
condition with respect to legal infrastructure implies that W~ = W~" while that
with respect to bonds implies W~P~, = W~,. The first order condition with respect
4Subscripts indicate a derivative with respect to the variable in the subscript. Primes in the
subscript indicate that the derivative is being taken with respect to the value in the next period,
while primes in a variable indicate next period values for that variable.
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to tax rates implies that:
UCC¢1 + fJW~, ((}¢l (f (~) - ~ l' (~)) - (1 + n)P~l - (1 + n)p~/B¢I) 1 ~ n
- fJW~, (1 ~ln) + fJW~/B¢1 + fJW~/P~1 = 0 (11.98)
A similar first order condition is found for capital taxes. Combining the above first
conditions I obtain the following condition, with a similar one to be satisfied once
again for capital taxes:
(II. 99)
In the previous section, for the case of commitment, I found that in a steady
state that capital taxes would be equal to zero, and that the value of bonds in the
steady state would be equal to their value prior to entering the steady state, so that
legal infrastructure would be primarily funded by labor taxes. Ortigueira and
Pereira (2007) find that when Markov Perfect Equilibria are applied to case of
unbalanced budgets, that one of the multiple steady states existing under
discretionary policy will correspond to that obtained as a solution to the Ramsey
problem. However, in the case of the model examined in this chapter, this result
does not hold.
Proposition 11.3. There does not exist a steady state Markov Perfect equilibrium
that is identical to the steady state obtained as a solution to the Ramsey problem
Proof In a steady state, the envelope theorem implies that the derivative of the
48
value function with respect to physical capital must satisfy:
(1+n)TtVK-~WK (aK (1 (~) -~ l' (~) ) - (1 + n)P~ - CK) - (l+n)ucCK
=~WK(1-6k+1' (~)
If it were the case that there existed a steady state Markov Perfect
equilibrium identical to that obtained from the Ramsey problem, then the above
first order condition would reduce to the Euler equation for the household under no
capital taxes. This would imply that:
(1 + n)vVK - 1+ n)WK - ~WK (aK (1 (~) -~ l' (~) ) - (1 + n)P~ - CK)
- (1 + n)ucCK = (1 + n)VVK
This would be satisfied if both (1 + n)Uc = ~WK and
aK (1 (~) -~ l' (~)) - (1 + n)P~ = 0 (11.100)
were satisfied. However, the first condition will only he consistent with equation
(11.99) if O"cjJjccjJp which will in general only be satisfied when acjJl = O. This would be
inconsistent with the static first order condition of the household which must he
satisfied by acf;l' except in the extreme case where T = O.
This result would imply a gap between the steady state under the Ramsey
problem and that found under discretionary policy, which is consistent with my
findings in the previous subsection in the simpler approach to discretionary policy
D
as simply the first period of optimal policy under commitment. A third possible
approach to discretionary policy would be to adapt the Lagrangian setup employed
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in the section under commitment. That is, one may think of the problem under
discretion as simply maximizing the lifetime utility of the household, subject to the
implementation constraint and resource constraint, but with an additional sequence
constraints which give the household first order conditions for labor and capital in
terms of the policy functions of future government. The government's problem
under discretion may thus be thought of as simply a more highly constrained
version of the problem under commitment. In particular, governments will no longer
be able to take advantage of time inconsistencies in optimal policy, which was the
source of zero capital taxes in the steady state under commitment. This justifies the
gap between the steady states under commitment and under discretion found under
both the previous approaches to discretionary policy.
II.8 Discussion
In the literature on the differences between allocations under discretionary
policy and policy under commitment, the explanations work via private sector
expectations. Three relevant strands of the literature can be identified. First, there
is the optimal fiscal policy strand, which argues that for policy under commitment,
capital taxes will be set higher in the first period, and lower in subsequent periods.
Under discretion, government behavior is identical to that of the government under
commitment during the initial period. As a result, capital taxes will typically be
higher under discretion than under commitment. Second, Kydland and Prescott
argued that commitment by the central bank to a low average rate of inflation may
permit lower inflation than would result from discretionary monetary policy, with
little loss of output. The third strand consists of a dynamic reformulation of the
Kydland Prescott argument. Under traditional optimal control setting of the policy
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problem, the policymaker's optimal action will depend only on the economy's state
in the current period. Under discretionary policy, its target variables will depend
both on its current actions and on private-sector expectations. Commitment to
earlier policy promises will imply that the central bank's behavior will depend on
both current and past conditions, and thus introduces inertia into optimal policy
rules.
All three strands of the literature share the characteristic that if policy is
committed to at the initial period, then this will result in private-sector
expectations being derived from certain knowledge of future policy actions in each
possible state of the world. Policy may thus be chosen to affect both current
allocations and private-sector expectations, which allows for a superior outcome to
that attainable under discretionary policy.
Support for forward-looking elements in the New Keynesian models
employed by Woodford include first the determination of aggregate demand by real
rather than nominal interest rates. Second, aggregate demand will depend on
expected long-term real interest rates. These results may be derived from micro
foundations, in particular a household Euler equation, which jointly with the
resource constraint will determine capital accumulation. While the model of
economic growth and property rights determination presented here is deterministic,
government policy under commitment affects capital accumulation just as it does in
the models in the literature. An increase in legal infrastructure for the subsequent
period, Pt+l, will decrease the time spent in appropriation in that period, and thus
increase returns to both capital and labor. The increase in the interest rate will
affect the growth rate of consumption, and thus the accumulation of capital. As in
prior work on the difference between discretionary policy and policy under
commitment, it may be argued that discretionary policy is suboptimal with respect
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to policy under commitment.
Consider now the differences in the policymaker's problem under
commitment and discretion. Under commitment, the sequence of policies are set so
as to satisfy the implementation constraint in the initial period, thereby ensuring
that the household's first order condition will be satisfied throughout subsequent
periods. Under discretion, since the government cannot commit to a sequence of
policies through time, it must assure in each period that policies are set to satisfy
the implementation constraint from that period onwards. An increase in
consumption will reduce U c t and thus decrease the value of initial assets.,
Discretionary policy thus imposes an additional cost to increasing consumption in
the current period. Similarly, decreasing time spent in appropriation will increase
current interest rates, or increase the value of initial assets. The benefit of increasing
(Jt is thus higher. This implies that a lower steady state exists, with a lower level of
consumption, and a higher level of (J, induced by higher levels of legal infrastructure
and of taxes on wage income. The policy in this lower steady state is effective, in
the sense of discouraging appropriation and allowing for a higher steady state level
of capital to be maintained. We assumed that lima-->l hp = 0, so that investments in
the legal infrastructure are less effective as (J approaches 1. Thus, setting taxes and
investment in legal infrastructure so that (J > (In as occurs in the lower steady state
under discretion, is highly costly, and results in lowered consumption.
While the upper steady state level of (J, (J3, is close to its steady state level
under commitment, (Jr when T is close to zero, as the return to appropriation
increases, (Jr responds more quickly than (J3, given the added incentive under
discretion to maintain low levels of appropriation. This causes consumption in the
upper steady state under discretion to be lower than it is under commitment. In
addition, I note that the upper and lower steady states under discretion approach
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each other as T until the return to appropriation approaches a threshold level, above
which no steady state under discretion exists.
II.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed a model in which legal infrastructure, or the
level of protection of property rights, affects the probability of being caught if
agents engage in appropriation from their employer. This model has the
characteristic that under exogenous policy, there is a single steady state. We embed
this in a model of optimal fiscal policy, characterize the steady states under
commitment and under discretionary policy. Under commitment, I find that there is
a unique feasible steady state, and that welfare, as measured by the utility of the
representative household, will be decreasing in the level of return to appropriation.
An intuitive result is that taxes and legal infrastructure will also be increasing in T.
When policy is discretionary, that is, when the government is unable to commit to a
particular sequence of policies, then there will generally exist at least two steady
states. The upper steady state will not generally be significantly different from the
steady state under commitment. The lower steady state displays in fact a higher
level of legal infrastructure, and less time devoted to appropriation, but this is so
costly that consumption is lower than in the upper steady state.
This model differs from the existing theoretical literature on the connection
between economic growth and institutions in two key respects. First, legal
infrastructure or the level of protection of property rights is explicitly modeled as
accumulating over time, and then as explicitly entering into the household's
optimization problem via a probability function. Secondly, and perhaps most
importantly, I look at both discretion and commitment. The result of multiple
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steady states does not occur, as it does in other models, because of strategic
complementarities in the optimization problems of households and firms, but rather
because of the inability of the government to commit to policy.
This model not only argues in favor of growing protection of property rights
during the process of economic development, but also demonstrates the need for
commitment to policy over the long-run. In the set-up of the model, this would
imply that a sequence of policies, specifically investment in legal infrastructure, be
committed to in some initial period of the economy. Alternatively, one may use
Woodford's "timeless perspective" approach, and argue instead that the government
simply needs to set policy according to the pattern of behavior to which it would
have wished to commit itself at a date far in the past. This implies a
history-dependent approach to the reform and improvement of a country's legal
infrastructure.
In its current form, this model serves as a benchmark for the relationship
between economic growth and institutions. Future work will include first the
characterization of the dynamics of the model, both in the case of commitment and
discretionary policy, including transition dynamics between the two steady states
found under discretion. As alluded to earlier, our assumption of an exogenous
return to appropriation neglects the effect of development on return to
appropriation. A possible extension would thus be to make the return to
appropriation proportional to the level of per capita output. This would imply that
both interest rates and wages would depend on the level of protection of property
rights, and legal infrastructure would enter directly into the Euler equation. The
level of steady state physical capital would thus depend both on (]" and on p,
introducing an additional interaction between property rights and time spent in
appropriation. This will undoubtedly lead to richer dynamics and possibly more
steady states, but our analysis suggest that the distinction between results under
commitment and discretion will be preserved, arguing for the need of long-term
perspective on the part of the governments of developing countries alongside any
attempt to improve protection of property rights.
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CHAPTER III
ESCAPING THE POVERTY TRAP: THE EFFECT OF
LEAST SQUARES LEARNING
I1L1 Introduction
The transition of Western European economies from stagnation to rapid
growth and industrialization has long been a puzzle of economic historians. The
factors governing this transition from poverty to rapid and sustained growth of
incomes are critical not only to our understanding of industrialization but also to
the causes of current divergence in cross-country incomes. A number of authors
have tried to understand the latter issue by building models that contain multiple
steady states for either the level or the growth rate of per capita output. Poverty
traps in these models are thought to characterize existing conditions in both
preindustrial and less developed economies. The poverty traps are generated in a
number of fashions, through institutions, and threshold effects in both physical and
human capital. A seminal paper in this area is Azariadis and Drazen (1990) which
considers poverty traps generated both by threshold effects in physical capital, and
the role played in their formation by the accumulation of human capital. This
provides an explanation for the Great Divergence in incomes between countries, but
given the stability properties of the poverty trap, cannot explain the transition from
stagnation to modern sustained growth.
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There has been a more recent surge of activity in the literature on
transitions. One strand of this literature is focused on the process of structural
change, or a regime switch from an economy dominated by agricultural production,
to one in which modern industrial production allows for sustained economic growth.
Frequently, as in Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Galor and Weil (2000), this is
accompanied by a change in fertility behavior, and increased benefits from
education of children. Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) divide history into three
epochs: pre-market, pre-industrial market, and industrial growth. The transition to
the pre-industrial market occurs primarily through a switch from primitive to
specialized technologies as a result of population growth. The expansion in
specialization eventually makes it optimal for households to invest in human capital,
and thus in technological innovation. In an alternative approach, in which there is a
single sector, but human capital accumulation affects technical progress, Galor and
Tsiddon (1997) develop an overlapping generations model, in which individuals
differ in the level of human capital that they inherit from their parents.
Productivity gains are induced by an increase in the average level of human capital.
The model has multiple steady states. Structural changes of the dynamic system as
a consequence of increases in aggregate human capital result in the elimination of
the poverty trap. It replicates the change in growth observed at the onset of the
Industrial Revolution and the coincident accumulation of human capital. However,
the deterministic character of the model implies that the Industrial Revolution was
inevitable, and that the Great Divergence simply resulted from differences in timing
of the transition between countries.
Arifovic et al (1997) find similar results that are qualitatively similar, but
generated via a different approach. In particular, they use the Azariadis and Drazen
(1990) model, but augment it by an adaptive learning process, whereby agents learn
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optimal savings rates and education levels. Thus, rather than generating the
transition through structural change along the lines of Hansen and Prescott (2002)
or Galor and Tsiddon (1997), they no longer assume perfect foresight, and the
transition occurs as a result of experimentation by agents. Economies with low
initial levels of human capital will spend long periods of time in the poverty trap.
But, regardless of initial endowments, all economies will converge with probability
one to the high steady state, in which there is constant growth of human capital.
In this chapter, I apply least squares learning, i.e. where agents forecast
variables using simple ordinary least squares regressions, to the Azariadis Drazen
model. It replicates the results of Arifovic et al (1997) in that it permits an escape
path from the no-training poverty trap. However, a transition path to the
high-training steady state only exists under perfect foresight. Instead, adaptive
learning generates endogenous oscillations in investment in physical and human
capital. This chapter is thus related to a rather rich literature on endogenous cycles
in either physical or human capital, beginning with Goodwin (1951), in which
capacity limits and the requirement of positive investment generates oscillations in
physical capital investment. A number of authors have found the potential for
cycles and other nonlinear dynamics in overlapping generations models, including
Benhabib and Day (1982)and Reichlin (1986). More recently, Matsuyama (1999),
Walde (2002), and Kaas and Zink (2007) have found cycles in OLG models with
production, either through regime-switching between innovation and capital
accumulation, or because of discontinuities in productivity growth as a function of
the number of skilled workers. This chapter has a similar switching mechanism, in
that individuals switch between investment in physical and human capital. The
difference is that the switching is generated through bounded rationality rather than
discontinuities in production functions.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section III.2 briefly discusses
the Azariadis-Drazen model. Section III.3 describes genetic algorithms and
compares to least squares learning. Section IlI.4 presents the model and analytical
results for perfect foresight dynamics. Section IlI.5 analyzes stability under
learning. Section III.6 describes the escape path and transition dynamics when the
economy starts in the no-training poverty trap. Section III.7 concludes.
III. 2 Azariadis and Drazen Model
In the overlapping generations model proposed by Azariadis and Drazen,and
then used by Arifovic et al (1997), agents chose clt,consumption in their first period
of life, C2t+l, consumption in their second period of life, and Tt, the fraction of time
in the first period spent in training, to maximize lifetime utility. An individual's
human capital in their second period of life is given by
(III. 1)
where Xt is the average human capital of all agents at time t, and T; is the fraction
of time in training spent by agent i. Azariadis and Drazen show that there are at
least two equilibria. In the first, Tt = 0 for all t 2:: T, which implies
(III.2)
(III.3)
where rt and Wt are respectively the rental rate on physical capital and the wage per
effective unit of labor, and kt is physical capital per effective unit of labor. Each
worker's effective units of labor in their first period of life are given by (1 - T;)Xt,
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and equal to their human capital accumulation in the second period. Effective
physical capital kt and aggregate effective labor L t are then given respectively by
k _ K tt - N(2 - Tt)Xt
Lt = N(2 - Tt)Xt
as all individuals are solving identical optimization problems. The inequality (III.2)
implies that the return to investment in physical capital exceeds that to human
capital. The second condition (III.3) can be obtained from the requirement that
aggregate physical capital K t be equal to aggregate savings, and to the product of
effective labor and physical capital per effective units of labor. Azariadis and
Drazen show that there exists a stable, no-training steady state associated with this
corner equilibrium.
In the interior equilibrium, 'It > 0, and the following conditions characterize
the equilibrium:
(IlIA)
(III.5)
For this equilibrium, kt must be such that return to physical and human capital are
equal. The second condition has the same interpretation as for the corner
equilibrium. There is a second steady state associated with this equilibrium, where
k and 'I are constant, and Xt -t 00.
In this model, the dynamics rely inherently on the assumption of perfect
foresight accompanied with optimizing behavior by households. Under this
assumption, the no-education equilibrium is a steady state, and we will see no
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transition from this to the interior equilibrium. But, either stochastic shocks or
alternatively small deviations of the agents from optimal behavior under perfect
foresight, may result in the possibility of escape from the poverty trap.
Why introduce adaptive learning, or more generally, bounded rationality in
expectations, into the Azariadis Drazen model? First of all, much of the work
attempting to model transitions out of poverty traps is based on perfect foresight
models, and hence ignores the effect of expectations. Yet, if accumulation of human
capital is one of the causes of transitions out of poverty trap, then one should not
ignore the role of expected earnings and expected returns to education in
determining educational attainment. There are at least two possible ways to
introduce bounded rationality into the model. The first is to assume that agents
choose savings and training rates by trial and error. This is the approach taken by
Arifovic et aI, who use genetic algorithms to model this process of experimentation.
The second approach is to introduce stochastic shocks, and to assume that agents
form forecasts of wages and interest rates, upon which they base their choice of
savings and training rates. The latter approach is that taken in this chapter.
111.3 Learning and Genetic Algorithms
The learning process in Arifovic et al (1997) is modeled using a genetic
algorithm. Genetic algorithms have been primarily used in computing to find
solutions to optimization and search problems. They are loosely based on models of
genetic change, in which three stages determine the evolution of the population of
chromosomes from one period to the next: fitness evaluation, selection and then
mutation or genetic operators. In the use of genetic algorithms for adaptive search
processes, the relevant population is a set of binary strings, which can experience
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similar types of mutation as chromosomes. There is a large body of both theoretical
and empirical evidence showing that even for very large and complex search spaces,
genetic algorithms can quickly locate strings with high fitness ratings using a
population of 50-100 strings.
Arifovic et al (1997) encode decision rules of agents regarding saving and
education as binary strings. The fitness of each string is found by solving for the
lifetime utility the individual would have attained if it had been in use in the
previous period, taking aggregate variables as given. Reproduction then takes place
by choosing two strings at random from the population, and choosing the string
that has the higher fitness value. This process is repeated to yield a set of decision
rules that are on average more fit than those in use in the previous period. Each
chosen string is then subjected to two genetic operators: mutation and crossover.
This approach to learning yields a permanent transition from the poverty trap in
the Azariadis and Drazen model to the upper steady state, where there is sustained
growth in human capital.
Riechmann (1999) studies the dynamic properties of genetic algorithms. He
argues that selection, mutation and crossover correspond to three learning
mechanisms: imitation, communication, and experimentation. Consider the case
where the only possible genetic operator is that of selection/imitation. It may be
shown that this algorithm is a Markov process, in which uniform populations are
absorbing states. That is, all agents will eventually have the same decision rules.
This same result holds when the genetic operators include both selection and
crossover. Under mutation, there is a positive probability that a single bit of a
binary string will be changed. The stochastic nature of the genetic algorithm
implies that the Markov process no longer has an absorbing state. However, it may
be shown that the system asymptotically converges to a constant probability
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distribution of all states.
Arifovic et al (1997) analyze transitions when the economy starts in a
poverty trap. Initially, human capital will be very low, and the binary strings which
correspond to positive investment in human capital will have low fitness. Suppose
that the population was initially uniform, with decision rules corresponding to the
lower steady state values of saving and training. Low returns to human capital
means that selection will work against any agents investing in human capital
through education. Mutation implies that there will sometimes be one or more
agents who spent positive amounts of time in school. This will result in increases in
aggregate human capital over time. Once human capital is sufficiently high, the
fitness of strings associated with positive investment in human capital will increase,
until selection works against those who do not invest in human capital. Since
human capital does not depreciate, the economy will remain in the neighborhood of
the upper steady state.
While the results of Arifovic et al (1997) are quite appealing, in their
explanation of the long-run transition of economies out of no-training poverty traps,
and in the key role in this transition of social learning, the paper faces several
common criticisms of genetic algorithm approaches to learning. In particular, there
are no formal convergence results, and convergence of the algorithm may be quite
sensitive to choice of parameters. In addition, a literal interpretation of the learning
rules is quite difficult, in considering social learning processes rather than real
evolutionary processes. In this chapter, I propose to analyze a version of the
Azariadis Drazen model, augmented with productivity shocks, where expectations
are formed using least squares learning methods. While, this is a quite different
approach, in its focus on individual formation of expectations, rather than some
process of social learning, it allows for analytic results with respect to stability
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under learning, and also for the determination a set of conditions under which
transitions will be possible. In addition, the deviation from the assumption of
perfect foresight, or rational expectations in the presence of stochastic shocks, is
smaller, in the sense that agents will continue to behave optimally, subject to their
expectations of factor prices.
IlIA Model
This model closely follows that developed by Azariadis and Drazen (1990),
while allowing for stochastic shocks to aggregate productivity. In this economy,
individuals live for two periods, working in both periods. Savings in the first period
buys physical capital, combined in the subsequent period with the effective labor of
both the old and young, under the following production technology
17 KUL1-u (7
1. t = t t Ct (III.6)
where K t indicates aggregate physical capital in period t and L t total effective labor
in the same period. Production is perturbed in each period by the i.i.d. shocks Ct.
Each worker is endowed with one unit of time in every period. They may
increase their effective units of labor by devoting some fraction Tt of their time
endowment in their youth to training. Each individual born at date t inherits the
average level of efficiency units, Xt, determined by the decisions of the previous
generation. Since all individuals will face an identical maximization problem, we
may drop the i superscript, and find that Xt accumulates according to
(III.7)
64
In later simulations, I will assume the specific functional form:
A
2
(IlI.S)
Output per unit of effective labor is given by
(IlI.9)
where kt is once again the ratio of aggregate physical capital to the measure of
effective aggregate labor. The rental rates on physical capital and labor are given
by, respectively,
(III. 10)
(III.ll)
where wages are given per unit of effective labor. Since a period in the overlapping
generations model may be thought of as the length of a generation, or 30-40 years, I
assume full depreciation of physical capital, or 6k = 1. Agents maximize their
expected lifetime utility, given by
(III. 12)
subject to budget constraints given by
(III. 13)
(III. 14)
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In addition, I impose the restrictions that Clt :::; (1 - Tt)XtWt, and Tt E [0,1]. The
Lagrangian for their maximization problem is then given by
.Y =In(clt) + ,BEt ln(c2Hl)
+)'1 (((1 - Tt)XtWt - CIt) EtrHI + (1 + 1'(Xt)Tt)XtEtWt+l - EtC2t+d
+ A2 ((1- Tt)XtWt - Clt) + A3Tt + A4(1 - Tt) (IIl.15)
where equations (IIL13-IlL14) have been combined into a single budget constraint.
Equation (IlL15) implies the following first order condition with respect to Clt
(IlL16)
where I have substituted for Al = ,BEtC2t~I' In the case where A2 = 0 and the
condition of non-negative savings is not binding, this is simply the Euler equation.
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to Tt implies
,BEtC2t~l (-XtWtEtrt+1 + 1'(Xt)Tt Xt E tW HI)
-A2XtWt + AS - A4 = 0 (IlL17)
Finally, when the requirements that savings be non-negative and that Tt E [0,1] are
non-binding, the latter condition becomes simply an arbitrage condition between
returns to physical and human capital.
The optimization problem implies that the following set of conditions must
hold in equilibrium
(IlL18)
(IlLIg)
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Ttf3EtC2t~l (-XtWtEtrt+l + I'(Xt)Xt E tWHl) = TtXtWt(cl/ - f3EtC2t~lEtrt+l) (III. 20)
f3EtC2t~1 (-Xt wt E tr t+1 + I'(Xt)Xt E tWt+d ~ XtWt(c l / - f3EtC2t~lEtrHl) (IIl.21)
In addition, the equilibrium must satisfy the lifetime budget constraint
Aggregate capital K t +1 = Lt+1kHl accumulates through aggregate household
savings St. The equations governing capital accumulation are:
(IIl.22)
(1 - Tt-l)Wt--l - Clt-l
Qt
(III. 23)
(IIl.24)
where Clt is the ratio of 1st period consumption to human capital, and Qt is the
ratio of aggregate physical to human capital. Both Qt and Xt are pre-determined,
while all other variables, including both Tt and kt , are non-predetermined or "free"
variables.
III. 4. 1 Steady states
To proceed, I will first characterize the steady states of the equivalent
deterministic system. There are two possible steady states, one where T = 0 and the
other with T > 0 and constant growth in human capital. In order for the steady
state to have T = 0, it must be the case that savings is positive, or that the Euler
equation (IlI.19) holds with equality. This implies that
(IlI.25)
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Using equation (III.22), Cll may be expressed in terms of wages and interest rates in
the steady state
WZXz ( 1)Cll = -- 1 +-
1 + {3 f'z (III.26)
This implies that capital per effective worker in the lower steady state is determined
by
2k = _{3_(1 _ a)kQ _ (1 - a)kl
z 1 + {3 z (1 + {3)akl - 1
(III.27)
In order to satisfy the first order conditions, the steady state must also satisfy
(III.28)
Since for the lower steady state, human capital does not have a particular value,
there is actually a continuum of steady states such that T = 0, indexed by their
value of the human capital stock Xz. The inequality (III.28) points to a bifurcation
in the dynamic system depending on initial levels of human capital, which I will
explore in greater detail in the next section. In steady states with T > 0, the
arbitrage condition, equation (III.21) will bind. In addition, human capital will
grow, so that if sufficient time elapses, ,(Xt) ---t )../2. In this case, the steady state is
determined by the following conditions:
(III.29)
(III. 30)
where i = ),,/2.
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111.4.2 Perfect foresight equilibrium
Consider now the perfect foresight dynamic system, where I assume for
simplicity that physical capital fully depreciates each period, or 15k = 1. Any
equilibrium must satisfy the following set of equations:
(III.31)
(III.32)
(III.33)
since the Euler equation must bind in a perfect foresight equilibrium when capital
full depreciates. Equations (III.31) and (III.32) imply
kt S k;_1
k _ 1 _f3_ (1 - Tt-I)(1 - a)k't_1
t - 2 - Tt + a}l~a(6) 1 + f3 1 + "Y(Xt-I)Tt-1
(III.34)
(III.35)
where k;_1 - ak't_d"Y(Xt-I). The inequality (III.31) is equivalent to the condition
that the ratio of future wages to interest rates must equal or exceed the ratio of
present wages to the return of investment in human capital "Y(Xt). Now, define ki,t-I
as the value of kt when Tt = 0, and kh,t-I as the value of kt when Tt = 1. That is,
ki,t-I and kh,t-I are lower and upper bounds on kt such that the capital
accumulation equation will still be satisfied. There are then three distinct cases to
consider: ki,t-I < k;_1 < kh,t-I, k;_1 < ki,t-I, and kh,t-I < k;_I' In the first case,
there are two possible solutions, with Tt = 0, where the capital accumulation
equation would determine kt , and Tt > 0 where Tt and kt are jointly determined. In
the second case, no solution exists under our assumptions that the Euler equation
holds with equality, given that Tt is an element of the unit interval. The only
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solution possible in this case will imply that the positive savings constraint will be
binding. When physical capital fully depreciates, and there is zero savings, wages
will be zero in the next period. This would not be on an equilibrium path under
perfect foresight. Finally, for the last case, the unique solution implies Tt = 0,
Proposition I1LI. There exists a threshold value of human capital, i:, such that
when the initial value oj human capital Xo < x, there is a unique perfect foresight
equilibrium path) with Tt = 0 for all periods t. This path converges to the lower
steady state.
Proof. The proposition can only hold if for all periods, k:_ 1 > kh,t-l or
1 {3 (1- Tt-l)(l - a)kf_l akf_l
1 + a(;+fi) 1 + (3 1 + I'(Xt-l)Tt-l < I'(Xt-l)
This may be solved for Tt-l' In doing so, I obtain
(1 - a){3I'(Xt-l) - (1 + a(3)
Tt-l > (1 + {3h(Xt-d
This would always be true if 1 + a{3 > (1- a){3I'(xt-d, or when
If the initial value of human capital Xo satisfies Xo < x, then for t = 1, Tt = 0 in turn
implying no growth in human capital. Thus, Tt = 0 for all future periods. This
implies that effective physical capital evolves according to the following equation:
k - 1 {3 (1 _ a)ka - 1
t - 2 +~ 1 + (3 t-l
a(l+,6)
(III. 36)
Effective physical capital will be increasing when the derivative of the right-hand
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side of the equation exceeds 1. The curve defined by equation (III.36) will cross the
45-degree line when
1 (3 (1 _ a)aka - 1 = 1
2+~ 1 +(3 t-l
a(1+fJ)
which will be satisfied for kt - 1 = kz, or at the lower steady state. Effective physical
capital will be increasing for kt < kz and decreasing for kt > kz.
I now consider the dynamic system in the case where the initial level of
human capital exceeds the threshold value x. If kh,t-l > k;_l > kZ,t-l' then
o
kt = k;_l' In this case, the dynamic system may be written solely in terms of x and
T by eliminating kt using the latter equality.
1 - a (3 (1 - Tt-d(l - ah(Xt-l)Tt = 2 + - ---'-------'---'-,------'-----'--
a(l + (3) 1 + (3 a(l + 1'(Xt-l)Tt-l)
Xt = (1 + 1'(xt-dTt-l)Xt-.l
(III.37)
(III.38)
In order to evaluate local stability, I linearize equations (III.31-III.32) around the
upper steady state. Since limxt->oo 1" (Xt) = 0, then I may simply set 1'(Xt) = i and
linearize aroundkh , Th. I define it = log(Tt!Th), kt = log(kt/kh) and obtain
(III.39)
(III.40)
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This linear difference equation system will be saddle-point stable, if
(III.41)
Using the steady state conditions, I may show that B1 = O. The linear difference
equation system will be saddle-point stable provided that ex < 1 and B2 > 1. The
capital accumulation equation implies that
~ (1 - T) (1 - ex) ka > (2 _ T) k
1 + (3 1 +;YT
which in turn implies that
The saddle-path stability condition is thus satisfied. Furthermore, one can show that
the stable manifold corresponds to kt , while the unstable manifold corresponds to 'Tt.
Therefore, convergence to the upper steady state will only be possible when Tt = Th.
The value of B2 implies that in a neighborhood of the steady state, Tt will be
increasing if Tt > Th. Provided that the same behavior holds under the non-linear
dynamic system, the training ratio Tt will increase until it exceeds the threshold
referred to in the proof above, at which point k;_l > kh ,t-1, and the only possible
solution will be Tt = O. Transition to the upper steady state will be seen to require
The diagram below shows the relationship between Tt and Tt-1 taking Xt-1 as
given. This is obviously not a complete picture of the dynamics, as Xt also depends
on Tt-1 and will affect the evolution of the training ratio T in subsequent periods.
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However, it allows us to begin to comprehend the rather complex dynamics of this
model.
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Tt-l
1.0
Threshold for T
45° line
Fig. III.l: Dynamics of human capital investment: plot of 7t for Xt-l = 100, a = 0.36,
(3 = 0.98, ;\ = 50.
First of all, it may be easily shown that 7t is increasing in 7[-1 and decreasing
in the level of human capital stock Xt-l. This may be understood when we recall
that 7t-l will increase the human capital inherited by the young in period t. This
increase in the level of human capital increases incentives to invest in human
capital, as returns to this investment are increasing in the inherited level of
knowledge. On the other hand, higher levels of human capital in the previous
generation increases their wages and thus their physical capital accumulation. These
higher levels of physical capital increase wages, reducing incentives for investing in
training. In particular, if last period's wages are sufficiently large relative to the
return to human capital, then it will not be optimal for households to invest in
human capItal. This will be the case when kh,t-l < k;_I' If 7t-l, the proportion of
time spent in training in the previous period, increases, then labor income will
decrease, reducing the aggregate capital stock. In addition, this will increase human
capital Xt, further reducing kt . If there is a sufficient increase in 7t-l, then this will
cause households in period t to not invest in human capital.
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Proposition III.2. For every initial level of human capital with Xt > X, there exists
a unique sequence of values of Tt such that the economy converges to the upper
steady state.
Proof. First, consider the case where i(Xt) = i. Then the mapping between Tt and
Tt-l will be independent of any other variables:
I-a (3 (1- Tt_,)(l- a)i
Tt = 2 + n,(1 + (3) - --(3 ( )
u; 1 + a 1 + iTt-l
(III.42)
Let T* be the fixed point of this mapping. The capital accumulation equation for
the upper steady state implies that
(III.43)
This equation, combined with equation (III.29), implies that Th = T*. The evolution
of effective physical capital will follow kt+l = akfIi, where the steady state kh is
globally stable. Therefore, so long as the initial training ratio TO = Th, the economy
will converge to the upper steady state.
Now consider the case where i(Xt) < i. For simplicity, I shall initially
consider the case where i(Xt) = i for Xt 2: x. Convergence to the upper steady state
then requires that Tt = Th when human capital lies above the threshold x. If human
capital reaches this threshold in period T, then training in period T - 1 must satisfy:
1 - a (3 1 - a (1- TT-lh(XT-l)
Th = 2 + a(l + (3) - -1+-(3-a- 1 + i(XT-l)TT-l
XT-l(l + i(XT-l)TT-l) 2: i
(III.44)
(III.45)
By backwards induction, one can construct a sequence of such conditions that must
be satisfied by any path that allows for convergence to the upper steady state. In
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particular:
+ (3 I-a ( ) 2 I-aTT-l I+,i3~'Y XT-j - -~
TT-j = 'Y(XT-j) (2 + l:a - TT-1+ 1 )
(J I-a 1
xT_j(l + 'Y(xT-j))-l1-1-- I-a ~ XT-j+l
+ fJ a 2 +~ - TT-j+l
This in turn implies that for each initial value of human capital Xo, there exists an
initial value of training TO and a unique sequence {Tt, Xt}[=o such that the economy
converges to the upper steady state. The level of effective physical capital is
determined by kt = k!_l' The initial value of effective physical capital is determined
by xo, TO, and the initial level of aggregate physical capital. As i -----> 00, the
sequence of Tt and Xt becomes an infinite sequence which converges to the upper
steady state asymptotically.
Thus, under perfect foresight, we can establish both that no path will exist
[J
between the two steady states, and that a path to the upper steady state will exist
for every value of Xt > X. However, this path requires a unique value of TO for a given
value of Xo. This single condition for convergence to the steady state obtains from
the fact that in the perfect foresight equilibrium, the evolution of human capital and
the training rate Tt are independent of effective physical capital. But, if we
introduce aggregate productivity shocks, then training will depend on not only past
training and human capital, but also on past and expected effective physical capital.
IIL5 Adaptive Learning
In this section, I consider a slight modification to the model. In particular, I
assume that agents form their expectations of wages and interest rates by least
squares learning, and that there is a lower limit on both savings rates and training
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rates. That is, every agent will make some minimum level of investment in both
human and physical capital in the first period of life, and therefore,
Clt :::; (1 - ¢)(1 - Tt)XtWt and Tt 2': f. This modification is made both for tractability
in the model, but also to allow for the possibility that agents use a combination of
optimization and rule of thumb in choosing their investments in physical and human
capital. Furthermore, in order to assure that the lower steady state still exists and
to allow for potential depreciation of human capital, I assume that
Xt = Xt-l(l + ,(Xt-l)(Tt-l - fd))' For simplicity in what follows, I assume that
fd = f. These assumptions imply
-1 > (JE* -1 E*Clt _ t C2Hl tT't+l (III.46a)
(III.46b)
In order to simplify the learning algorithms, I assume that E;C2Hl = (E*C2t+d- 1
and that E;WHdE;T'HI = (1 - a)E;kt+1/a.1 In addition, I define Clt = Clt/Xt.
Under the assumption that the Euler equation binds, the first order conditions and
the capital accumulation equation imply that
(
,(Xt) ke ) l/a
a cO" t+l
t
_1_ ((1- Tt-l)(l- a)kf-lCf_l - Clt-l)
2 - Tt 1 + ,(Xt-d(Tt-l - f)
In order to simplify the notation, I define
1E;+l is an operator that can denote either rational or nonrational expectations
(III.47a)
(III.47b)
(III.48)
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The same analysis as under perfect foresight applies, where the interior solution will
only exist if kl,t-l ~ k; ~ kh,t-l, where only k; is defined differently from the
previous section. The ratio of aggregate physical to aggregate human capital'. which
I denote by Qt, is equal to kh,t-l' The requirement for the existence of the interior
solution then implies an upper and lower bound on the value of expected physical
capital k;+u where these bounds are functions of Qt, human capital Xt, and the
productivity shock Ct. Intuitively, a high value of expected physical capital leads to
an increase in training, due to high expected wages. But when expected physical
capital increases enough, the optimal level of Tt will no longer be feasible, due to a
binding savings constraint. Similarly, for low values of k;+l' training will decline,
until the solution of Tt = 0 is optimal. I note that while under perfect foresight, the
existence of the interior solution also implied existence of a corner solution with
Tt = 0, that is not the case under either rational expectations or adaptive learning.
In order to ensure that the individual's savings constraint is satisfied as well
as the Euler equation, the following inequality must also hold
1~ {3 ((1 - Tt)(l - a)kfcf + (1 + ,(Xt)Tt) 1: a k:+ 1 )
~ (1- ¢)(1 - Tt)(l - a)kfc~
The above inequality may be solved for kt :
(III.49)
This inequality may be interpreted as the minimum level of physical capital such
that for the given training ratio, the individual's savings constraint is satisfied.
77
When the savings constraint is in fact violated, then consumption will be
determined by the binding savings constraint. This savings constraint, combined
with equation (IlL46b) and the capital accumulation equation, will determine values
of Tt and kt. In particular, by combining the savings constraint with (IlL46b) I
obtain:
This may be simplified to
[3(1 - Tt) (I'(Xt)1 : a k~+l - ¢(1 - a)kfcf )
S; ¢(1 - Tt)(l- a)kfcf + (1 + I'(Xt)Tt) 1- a k~+l
a
The above expression may be solved for kt :
(IlL50)
Due to the highly nonlinear characteristics of this model, I may not easily
solve for the rational expectations equilibria, and then use those to determine
appropriate learning rules for the agents in their formation of expectations for
effective physical capital. However, for large enough values of human capital,
I'(Xt) ~;y. In the interior equilibrium, where the Euler equation is binding and
Tt > 0, the evolution of effective physical capital in the REE will be closely
approximated by:
(IlL51)
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Using the method of undetermined coefficients, I posit a solution of the form:
(III. 52)
if agents' perceived law of motion is given by equation (III.52). Substituting into
equation (III.51)gives the corresponding actual law of motion
This implicitly defines the mapping from the perceived law of motion (PLM)to the
actual law of motion (ALM)
T (III.53)
Any rational expectations equilibrium must be a fixed point of the latter mapping.
The fixed points are
An= (*)1/11-0),a1 ~a2=O,a3~-;
Ao = ~,al = ex, a2 = (J, a3 is arbitrary
ry
(III.54)
(III.55)
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In the low-training equilibrium, where 7t = f in all periods, the evolution of
effective physical capital is determined solely by the capital accumulation and Euler
equations:
k 1 ( 13 ( -)( )kQ: cr 1 1 - a ke )t=-- --1-7 I-a E -----2 - f 1 + 13 t-l t~l 1 + 13 a t (III.56)
so that effective physical capital is now predetermined. There is a unique rational
expectations equilibrium for the above dynamic system, which takes the form
where
A
o
= af3(l - f)(l - a)
1 + a + (2 - f)af3
This equilibrium will only exist when human capital lies below a threshold given by
() 1 + a(l - f) + af3(2 - f)
"'I Xt S; 13(1 _ a)
Having established the rational expectations equilibria in a neighborhood of
each steady state, the next step is to establish whether these REE are
expectationally stable or E-stable. That is, I shall consider the stability of the REE
under a learning rule corresponding to the relevant perceived law of motion (PLM)
in which the parameters are adjusted slowly in the direction of the implied ALM
parameters.
Proposition 111.3. In the high-training equilibrium, where "'I(Xt) ~ i, both REE
are E-unstable. In the low-training equilibrium, the REE is E-stable.
Proof. First, consider the REE in the high-training equilibrium. E-stability will be
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satisfied when the parameters of the REE correspond to a stable steady state of the
differential equation
Ao Ao Ao
d a1
=T
a1 a1
d!Y
a2 a2 a2
a3 a3 a3
In the case where a1 = a2 = 0 under the REE, it will be E-stable when 0:'-1 < 1, and
E-unstable when 0:'-1 > 1. The latter case will always hold when 0 < 0:' < 1. In the
case where a1 = 0:' and a2 = 0", the equilibrium will be E-unstable if (1 + 0:')/0:' > 1
which once again will be satisfied for 0:' < 1.
Now, consider the REE in the low-training equilibrium. The T-mapping
between the PLM and the ALM is given by
E-stability will be satisfied if T'(Ao) < 1, satisfied for the same condition on 0:' as
before.
In a sequential approach to fully characterizing the dynamics of the full
o
non-linear model under learning, I next consider linearizations around both the
upper and the lower steady states. These linearizations, unlike the dynamic systems
analyzed in this section, allow for small deviations from Tt = f in the no-training
equilibrium and I'(Xt) = i in the interior equilibrium.
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III. 5.1 E-stability in the interior equilibrium
In the interior equilibrium, the first order conditions imply that
Wt = w(kf+I)' or
(III.57)
If I define Zt = XiI, redefining the function 'YO so that it is in terms of Zt, then
equation (III.57) implies
The complete dynamic system will be described by the capital accumulation
equation
(III.58)
the accumulation equation for human capital (III. 7), and the relationship between
Qt, effective physical capital kt,and the proportion of time spent in training Tt, or
(III.59)
The conditions for the steady state of this system, under which Et = 1, are identical
to conditions for the upper steady state of the perfect foresight system, with
Qh = (2 - Th)kh. In order solve for the rational expectations equilibrium, I
log-linearize the system around the steady state. For the purposes of this
linearization, I define kh,t = log(kt/kh), Qh,t = log(Qt/Qh) , Th,t = log (Tt/Th) ,
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Et = log(Et), and obtain:
A A Th
k - Q + Th,t+l - h,t+l -2-- h,t+l
- Th
Zt-l
Zt =
1 +1Th
where
(III.60)
(III.61)
(III.62)
(III.63)
for each variable var. By using equation (III.62) to substitute for Th,t, the linear
system becomes
QhQh,t+l = (QhfQ + fTQhgdQh,t + (JE + fTgE)Et + (Jz + fTgZ)Zt
+ (JTkhgk + khfk)EJ';h,t+l (III.64)
(III.65)
(III.66)
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This may be written in matrix form as
an a12 0 0 Qh,t+l dn 0 d13 0 Qh,t
0 a22 0 1 Ct d21 0 d23 0 Ct-l
0 0 1 0 Zt+l 0 0 d33 0 Zt
0 1 0 0 k h t 0 0 0 0 k h ,t-l,
b1 0
b2 0
+ Et k h ,t+l + Vt (III.67)
0 0
0 1
By premultiplying by the matrix of {aij}, I obtain
Qh,t+l on 0 013 0 Qh,t (31 (1
Ct 0 0 0 0 Ct-l 0 1
- + Et k h,t+l + Vt (III.68)
Zt+l 0 0 033 0 Zt 0 0
k ht 041 0 043 0 k h ,t-l (34 (4,
The rational expectations equilibrium for the linear system will then be in the form:
~ ~
kh,t = b1Qh,t + b2Zt + b3Vt
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If the PLM for kh,t takes the same form as under the REE, then the T-mapping
between the PLM and the ALM is given by
In the REE, the values of b1, b2, b3 are given by the fixed point of the T-map, with
al = 611 + 131b1, a2 = 613 + 131 b2633, a4 = (1. This REE will be E-stable if the
Jacobian of the T-map evaluated at the REE has eigenvalues that are strictly less
than unity. But, I find that the eigenvalues are 134, 633 and (4. Evaluating
134 = (kh gk)/(2 - Th) = a-I, which exceeds unity provided that a E [0, :I.]. Therefore,
the conditions for E-stability are not satisfied. Furthermore, real time learning
shows that the upper steady state will not be stable under learning, and that the
coefficients b1, b2,b3 will not converge to their REE values.
III.5.2 E-Stability in the no-training equilibrium
In a neighborhood of the lower steady state, the condition that Wt > w(kf+l)
will hold, so that Tt = Tt-l = O. Defining kt = 10g(kt/k1) , log-linearizing around the
lower steady state gives
This linear equation has the associated REE
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If agents have the PLM that kt+1 = ao + alkt + a2Et, then the fixed point of the
T-map
1 1-a
(2 - 1') (1 + ,8) a ao
(2 _ 1')1(1 + ,8) (,8(1- 1')(1 - a)akr-1 - 1 : a a1)
1 (_ a-I 1 - a )(2 _ 1')(1 + ,8) ,8(1 - 7)(1 - a)akl (J - -a-a2 (III.69)
corresponds to the REE. This fixed point will be E-stable if the eigenvalues of
DT(o'o, 0,1) have real parts less than 1, or
1 1-a
< 1(2 - 1') (1 + ,8) a
which will be satisfied for ,8 > 0 and 0 < a < 1. Finally, the equilibrium is also be
stable in simulations of real-time learning.
III. 5. 3 Stability under learning of non-linear model
Let us consider stability under learning for the full nonlinear model of the
interior equilibrium, in the case where initial human capital is such that 'Y(Xt) ~ i.
The learning rule of agents is assumed to take the form described in the previous
section for this equilibrium. In this section, I shall describe the results of a series of
simulations of the non-linear model under these assumptions. Figure III.2 shows the
results for the first of these simulations, where there are no productivity shocks, but
where initial effective physical capital is slightly above its upper steady state value.
Learning has a constant gain of'lfJt = 0.1, and the lower bounds on training and
savings are set to l' = 0.05, ¢ = 0.05. One can observe that effective physical capital
very quickly leaves a neighborhood of the upper steady state, and then oscillates
86
around the steady state value through the duration of the simulations. This is due
to switching in economy between a binding savings constraint and periods in which
Tt = f. The initial condition causes expected effective physical capital to exceed the
steady state value, in turn leading to increases in time invested in training, until the
savings constraint becomes binding. Then, when minimum savings leads to a
decline in aggregate physical capital, and expected physical capital, this eventually
leads to a return to the interior solution for Tt and then to Tt = f. Finally, the latter
result causes sharp increases in Qt until the economy returns to a binding
constraint, and the cycle repeats.
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Fig. III.2: Time paths of effective physical capital and training, where ft = 1, TO = Th,
ko > kh , Th = 0.26, kh = 0.0013
I then introduce an exogenous shock ft where
The effect of these productivity shocks is similar to that of small deviations from
the steady state value of k, in that it leads to oscillations between a binding savings
constraint and Tt = f. Increasing CJ, will increase both the mean and the standard
deviation of effective physical capital kt , due largely to the potential for greater
increases in kt during periods when Tt = f. This behavior is unaffected by varying
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the value of the minimum training and savings rates - this simply changes the
amplitude of the said oscillations.
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Fig. III.3: Oscillations of effective physical capital
111.6 Transitions from Lower Steady State
In a first effort to understand the dynamics of escape paths from the lower
steady state, suppose that agents have the perceived law of motion:
(III.70)
where Ao has the same value as in the REE of the low-training equilibrium. Since in
the interior equilibrium, with Tt > T, effective physical capital is determined jointly
with the training rate and is not predetermined. Therefore kf+l = Ao(knO<ff:
If agents know the true value of all parameters of the model, then simulations show
Tt = T for all periods, regardless of the value of a,. This result holds provided that
')'(Xt) is sufficiently small.
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Therefore, I propose introducing an additional stochastic shock, to
households' expectations of wages, so that EtWHI = (1 + ';t)(1 - a)(kf+l)a, where ';t
is assumed to be i.i.d. If Xt is close to the threshold referred to above, then a small
positive shock xit will have the same effect. The postulated perceived law of motion
implies that the evolution of Tt will be independent of current productivity shocks.
As a result, training rates increase until the lower bound on savings becomes
binding. The only shock which impacts Tt is the expectational shock. Provided the
expectational shock has a small standard deviation, then the economy will remain
at high levels of training.
Now, suppose that agents do not know the exact values of parameters, but
that they assume the law of motion for effective physical capital takes the form:
k - eao ka1 c a2 c a3t - t-I '--t-I '--t (III.?1)
where the values of the parameters are estimated by regressing In(kt) on
(In(kt-I),ln(Et-I),ln(Et))'. The initial deviations of the estimated parameters from
their REE values have an identical effect initially to the expectational shocks ';t, in
that they allow the economy to escape from the minimum training equilibrium.
Furthermore, least squares learning of the parameters also ensures that Tt will be
affected by levels of effective physical capital and by the aggregate productivity
shock. As a result, in the simulations, we observe oscillations, similar to those
observed when the economy started at the high steady state.
Figure (III.5) shows the evolution over time of the estimated coefficients for
the case of constant gain. The oscillations of Tt and kt inevitably perturb the values
of these coefficients, so that they do not, even for the case of decreasing gain,
converge to their values in either of the rational expectations equilibria identified for
(a) Training rate Tt (b) Effective physical capital k t
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Fig. IlIA: Oscillations of capital, training for O"E = 0.5 and ko = kz
this model. This behavior is particularly evident for al and a3, the coefficients on
effective physical capital and white noise terms respectively. If we use 'ljJt = r 1 , then
the values of ao and a2 return to their values under the REE for minimum training,
while al > a in the limit, and a3 < 0, so that neither return to their original values.
50
(12
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4
Fig. IIl.5: Variation in estimated coefficients, for 'ljJt = 0.07
Therefore, shocks to expectations, either in the form of an i.i.d. stochastic
shock like ~t, or shocks resulting from the effect of the aggregate productivity shock
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on learned parameters, allow the economy to escape the low-training productivity
trap. In addition, sufficiently large shocks to expectations, as we observed in the
case of constant gain learning of key parameters, permit agents to oscillate from one
generation to another, between maximum investment in human capital and physical
capital. Provided that the variance of the stochastic shocks is large enough to
permit this oscillation to take place, the size of the oscillations will be independent
of Et, and will only depend on ¢ and T, the minimum savings and training rates. As
seen in figure (III.6), the oscillation in training rates permits the model to capture
both growth cycles and a long-run positive trend in aggregate output.
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Fig. III.6: Aggregate output
III. 7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered the stability and transition dynamics of the
Azariadis Drazen model of economic growth and human capital accumulation under
adaptive learning. I found that like the perfect foresight model, the no-training
equilibrium, in its linearized form, was stable around its steady state under learning.
However, the interior equilibrium was not E-stable or stable under learning.
Adaptive learning or expectational shocks allow the economy to escape from the
low-training equilibrium, and generate endogenous oscillations in both human
capital and physical capital investment. The model thus captures both endogenous
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growth cycles and long-run positive trends in output as a result of the escape from
the poverty trap. It clearly establishes the role of expectations in the escape path.
Transitions out of the poverty trap are no longer deterministic, as they are in much
of unified growth theory. This may provide a possible answer to the question: What
accounts for the sudden switch to sustained growth in some countries, while
stagnation has continued in others?
Two questions remain. Why does a path to upper steady state exist under
perfect foresight, while the same does not appear to exist under learning? Why does
adaptive learning generate endogenous oscillations rather than a smooth transition
path? First, I remind the reader that the existence of the perfect foresight path was
dependent on the independence of the evolution of training from effective physical
capital, and on the choice of a unique initial training rate given initial human
capital. The dynamics of Tt under rational expectations and learning will depend
also on both lagged and expected physical capital, and may depend on current
productivity shocks. In addition, just as the perfect foresight path was dependent
on an initial choice of Tt, the same holds true under learning, and the mechanism for
escape from the low-training steady state may not assure that this condition is
satisfied.
Recall that under adaptive learning, when Wt > w(k~+l)' because of positive
productivity shocks, Tt = T. Returning to the question of social learning vs.
adaptive learning, I note that under genetic algorithm learning, fitness of Tt and the
savings rate is evaluated using wage and interest rates to calculate the lifetime
utility that would have been obtained had a particular training or savings rate been
in use in the previous period. The instability of the system under least squares
learning derives at least in part from the ability of optimizing agents to react to
productivity shocks by substituting investment in physical capital for investment in
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human capital. They may do this without any negative effect on human capital,
since the accumulation of human capital by previous generations has a permanent
effect on human capital, provided that training equals or exceeds its minimum value
T. Switching in whether human or physical capital has the highest returns results in
oscillations in training rather than the smooth increases in average training rates
observed under social learning. This frequency of oscillations is increased by the
one-time choice of agents whether or not to invest in physical/human capital.
Increasing agents' lifespan above two periods could allow them to smooth their
physical capital investments, particularly if physical capital investments occur more
frequently than those in human capital.
Understanding the differences between social and econometric learning is
important not only within the context of growth theory and escape paths from
poverty traps, but more broadly in the literature on bounded rationality. While in
the case of most macroeconomic models, least squares learning and social learning
generate similar results, there have been a few examples identified in the two
approaches generated different results. In particular, Arifovic et al (2007), in a New
Keynesian model of monetary policy, found that equilibria which were unstable
under recursive learning were in fact stable under social learning. As yet, there is no
general principle allowing us to identify models in which the learning dynamics will
be different under the two algorithms.
Social learning differs from econometric learning in the greater bounds placed
on rationality and in the heterogeneity of agents. It then remains to determine
whether the distinction between the application of social learning and least squares
learning to the Azariadis Drazen model is a consequence solely of the greater
bounds placed on rationality under social learning, or of the heterogeneity of agents
allowed for in genetic algorithms. One possible extension of the model introduced in
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this chapter could include introducing heterogeneity into agents expectations. A
convenient tool would be to make the expectation shock ~t idiosyncratic, and then
to observe any differences in the stability of the upper steady state and in the
transition dynamics. An additional possible extension would be to allow for Td' the
minimum level of human capital investment to avoid depreciation, to depend on the
existing accumulation of human capital. Thus as the stock of knowledge in
economies accumulates, individuals require more and more investment in training in
order to access this knowledge. This could dampen the oscillations in human
capital, by introducing an additional channel through which the externality in
human capital could affect individuals' decisions.
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CHAPTER IV
HUMAN CAPITAL, INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSITIONS
BETWEEN GROWTH REGIMES
IV.! Introduction
The determinants of stability and economic growth are fundamental to our
understanding of the process of economic development. The econometrics of
economic growth has largely focused on determinants of long-run growth. However,
developing countries not only face greater macroeconomic volatility, the negative
effects of volatility on growth are also larger in LDCs (less developed countries).
Furthermore, Montiel and Serven (2005) report that extreme volatility, or that
portion of volatility generated by crises, increased in developing countries in the
1980s and the 1990s, during the very period when most developed countries were
experiencing a dramatic decline in volatility. This volatility may be an important
contributor to the entire process of development. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find
that the predominance of shocks in developing countries are not transitory but
instead affect the trend.
More recently, attention has begun to be given to the topology of growth.
Pritchett (2000) identified phases of growth, stagnation or decline of varying length
experienced by most countries. Jerzmanowski (2006) uses a Markov-switching
regression to find transition probabilities between stable growth, rapid growth,
stagnation and crisis and analyzes the effect of institutions on such transitions. A
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set of papers, Hausmann et al (2005,2006) examines periods of rapid acceleration of
growth as well as crisis episodes.
These approaches allow us to capture the nonlinear dynamics associated with
growth, rather than assuming that long-run growth is identified with a single steady
state, with the level of growth being determined by a set of country characteristics.
In particular, the four regimes employed by Jerzmanowski capture a poverty trap
equilibrium, a stable growth equilibrium, and then transitions between the two.
This allows us to distinguish between countries which experience stable growth, and
others which transition out of a poverty trap via miracle growth. In the specification
he employs, transition probabilities vary across countries, according to a static
measure of economic institutions. He finds that better institutions lead to greater
persistence of both stable and miracle growth regimes. In particular, countries with
the highest quality of institutions, experience a sharp increase in the likelihood of
transitioning from miracle growth to stable growth. Stagnation and crisis are both
much more likely in countries where property rights are poorly protected.
While Jerzmanowski (2006) makes a unique contribution to the literature, its
methodology has some limitations. The specification of transition probabilities is
time-invariant. In addition, the author assumes that the only variable determining
probabilities is institutions. The measure of institutions used is the index of
government anti-diversion policies, averaged over 1985-1995. The use of the average
value of an institutional measure would be perfectly adequate were it the case that
institutions were highly persistent. However, while it is the case that countries
which have attained the highest quality of political and economic institutions do
tend to remain there over time, I will present evidence in this chapter that there is
tremendous volatility in the quality of institutions in less developed countries.
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In particular, the static measure of institutions ignores the dynamic effects of
wars and economic crises on transition probabilities. In the case of wars and other
such disasters, Hausmann et al (2004) has found them to have a negative and
significant impact on the likelihood of crisis. In the case of human capital
accumulation, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and other similar models have given us
a theoretical basis for regime switching when sufficient levels of human capital have
been attained. The goal of this chapter is to examine determinants of transitions
between growth regimes, using a broader set of explanatory variables, including
indicators of changes in political regimes.
IV.2 Existing Evidence for Regime Switching in the Process of
Economic Development
IV. 2.1 Theoretical literature
The theoretical literature in economic growth in rich in models characterized
by multiple equilibria. This includes the seminal paper, Azariadis and Drazen
(1990), where increasing social returns to scale in the accumulation of human
capital permits multiple steady states. Similarly, models of the relationship between
institutions and development are frequently characterized by multiple equilibria.
For example, Gradstein (2007) views an equal distribution of political power as a
commitment device that will permit improvements in institutions and thus
economic growth. He shows the existence of two possible equilibria, one with
low-quality institutions, slow growth and the other with higher quality and more
egalitarian institutions, and faster growth. Tornell (1997) finds that for certain
parameter values, and allowing for three property rights regimes - common
property, private property, and oligarchy - all Markov perfect equilibria involve a
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shift from common property to private property and back to common property.
This model, along with the existence of multiple equilibria in the other models
described above, seems to argue in favor of a regime-switching approach in empirical
studies of economic growth.
Another more recent branch of the economic growth literature attempts to
rationalize the greater volatility that we observe in developing countries. Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997) argue that economic development is associated with a decline in
volatility due to better diversification opportunities and more productive use of
funds. "Lucky" countries will spend relatively less time in the stage of low growth
and high volatility and may thus experience miracle growth. However, their model
does predict that in the long-run, economies will converge to high and stable levels
of income. Cetorelli (2002) proposes a similar model to that of Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997), in that the probability of adverse production shocks decreases as
the economy develops. His model also identifies a variety of dynamic equilibria
consistent with club convergence, growth miracles and growth disasters. In
particular, there is the possibility of mobility within the distribution of cross-country
incomes, and thus lends itself to empirical estimation by regime switching models.
Iv'2.2 Empirical Literature
There has long been a concern with reconciling results on conditional
convergence in the empirical literature with theoretical models of growth generating
multiple equilibria. Benhabib and Gali (1995) surveys existing models of growth
with multiple equilibria, and discusses some of the empirical predictions generated
by those models. They argue that some of the predictions of growth models with
unique equilibria are hard to reconcile with the evidence, and that existing evidence
does not rule out the existence of multiple equilibria in the data. Durlauf and
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Johnson (1995) uses classification and regression tree methods, and find evidence in
favor of multiple regimes in economic growth. In particular, they find that even
after controlling for heterogeneity in parameters, there is a role for initial conditions
in explaining variation in cross-country growth behavior. Papageorgiou and
Mansanjala (2004) test the robustness of the Durlauf and Johnson results by using a
CES production function. Using initial income and adult literacy as threshold
variables, they find evidence of four regimes.
However, these studies only consider multiple regimes in long-run patterns of
growth, and hence do not allow for transitions between steady states or between
regimes. Recently, Jerzmanowski (2006) estimates a Markov-switching regression to
characterize four growth regression. He employs a static measure of institutions .. a
1986-1995 average over several categories of data collected by Political Risk Services
- as the sole determinant of transition probabilities between growth regimes. He
finds that better institutions make continued stable growth more stable, and make
the stable growth regime more likely to follow a period of rapid growth. In addition,
improved institutions make rapid growth more likely to follow either periods of
crisis or periods of stagnation.
An alternative measure to the index of government anti-diversion used by
Jerzmanowski is the variable "constraints on the chief executive" from the Polity IV
dataset, frequently used as an alternative measure of property rights and protection
from government expropriation. This variable varies from 1 to 7, where 7 represents
the highest level of constraints on the executive branch of the government. One can
observe that while there is persistence in the variable, particularly for those
countries starting at the highest value, there is certainly dynamic variation in this
measure of institutions across the sample period. This time-series variation in
institutions, particularly as a result of political regime changes, may contribute
99
Tab. IV.1: Transition probability matrix for constraints of executive branch of
government, sample of 89 countries from 1962-1994
Quality of
institutions in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All
1962/1994
1 0 0.08 0.38 0 0.23 0 0.31 0.16
2 0.5 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0.05
3 0 0.18 0.23 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.27
4 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.04
5 0.17 0 0.17 0 0 0.5 0.16 0.07
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.01
7 0.03 0 0.09 0 0.12 0 0.76 0.4
All 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.46 1
The entry in row i, column j, indicates the probability
of moving from an institutional quality of i in 1962 to a
quality of j in 1994.
significantly to switches in growth regimes, and is omitted from the Jerzmanowski
specification.
Rather than looking at a full set of growth regimes, Hausmann et al (2005,
2006) analyze the determinants of periods of crisis and growth accelerations. They
find that changes in political regimes as well as wars and sudden stops in capital
flows can precipitate periods of crisis and/or growth accelerations. But, they find
that levels of human capital accumulation and other controls for economic
development do not have a significant impact on either the likelihood or the
duration of accelerations or crises. Hausmann et al (2004, 2006) admit to a
relatively low fit of their specification. This is partly because the events they are
trying to predict are relatively rare. The authors identify only 83 episodes of
accelerations for 1950-2000, using the Penn World Tables dataset. While these
episodes may be more frequent than one may at first suspect, as Hausmann et al
(2004) argue, they are frequently the results of relatively small shocks or changes in
policy. Standard control variables in cross-country growth regressions, including
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human capital, do a very poor job predicting turning points in growth.
I therefore propose estimating a Markov-switching regression, like that used
in Jerzmanowski (2006), but using a broader set of possible control variables for
estimation of transition probabilities, including a set of discrete variables, measuring
changes in political regimes, wars, and sudden stops, as well as continuous variables,
including measures of institutions and human capital accumulation. With respect to
institutions, I propose using a time-varying measure of institutions, which will
avoid, to some extent, the problem of endogeneity inherent in the Jerzmanowski
approach, in that average quality of institutions from 1986-1995 may be the
outcome of growth regimes occupied by the economy prior to 1986. In addition,
considering the role that human capital accumulation plays in such transitions will
contribute to the ongoing literature regarding the causal relationship between
education and economic growth.
IV.3 Empirical Methodology and Data
Many theoretical models of the role of institutions and human capital
accumulation in economic growth are characterized by two steady states, of which
one is a poverty trap. In order to fully allow for the possibility of two stable states,
and transitions to and from these states, a minimum of four regimes is required in
the empirical specification. Growth of output per worker follows an AR( 1) process
[h,t = /-Lskt + ¢sktYk,t-l + Ek,t,Skt
Ek,t,Skt i.i.d.N(O,O";J
(IV.1a)
(IV.lb)
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where Skt is the regime in place in country k in period t. The regime affects both
the coefficients on lagged growth and the variance of the stochastic shock. I
Transition probabilities between regimes are country-specific, and are
determined by a vector of variables Xi t:,
P( . I . ) - ioil ( )Skt = ~l Sk,t-l = ~o = Pkt Xkt (IV.2)
I follow Diebold et al (1994) in specifying the transition probabilities as
iOI( )-1 ,",3 iOi1 ( )Pkt Xk,t - - L..,iI=1 Pkt Xkt
Since the states are unobservable, parameters will be chosen to maximize the
expected complete-data log likelihood, conditional upon the observed data, given
below:
N 3L(~,T, Yb,IXk,T; 0) ~ £;{~Pi[log f(Yk1lsk1 ~ i, YkO) + IOg(Pi)]
+ ( 1 - t Pi) [IOgf(YkJISkl ~ 4, YkO) + log ( 1 - t Pi) ]
T 4
+8 [~P(Skt ~ il~T, X"kT) log f(Yktlsk" Ykt-tl
3 4
+ L L P(Skt = iI, Skt-l = i ol'?9kT' 3CkT ) logp~~il
il=lio=l
+t P(skt ~ 4, Skt-1 ~ ioI~1', X"kT) log (1 - I>1::i,)]} (IY.3)
to=l tl=l
To clarify the notation, '?9kT indicates the complete history of growth for country k,
1A single lag is used in the empirical specification, due to the fact that when estimating an AR(p)
model with country fixed effects only one lag is significant.
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through period T, while Pi indicates the unconditional probability of state i
occurring in country k in the initial period. The vector of all parameters is given by
e. Given the AR-1 process specified for Ykt, the density of Ykt conditional on Skt and
Yk,t-l is:
(IVA)
For the filter leading to the smoothed probabilities P(Skt = il~T, X"kT) and
P(Skt = iI, Skt-l = iol~T, X"kT) , I would ask the reader to refer to Diebold et al
(1994). Taking the smoothed probabilities as given, the first order conditions with
respect to Mi' (PiandlJi are given by
(IV.5)
(IV.6)
(IV.?)
These parameters may be calculated by estimating the smoothed
probabilities given an inital parameter vector eo, and then updating the parameters
Mi' (Pi, lJi using the above first order conditions.
The first order conditions for (3ioi 1 are nonlinear in the parameter:
N T
L L Xk,t-l {P(Skt = iI, Skt-l = iol~T, X"kT)
k=l t=2
- P(Skt-l = iol~T, X"kT)P~~il} = 0 (IV.8)
The parameters are thus updated by using numerical methods to solve the above
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nonlinear equations for {3ioi1 • Once a new set of parameter values is obtained, the
smoothed probabilities are once again calculated, and the process is repeated, until
a convergence criterion is satisfied.
The vector Xkt may be composed of two groups of explanatory variables:
non-discrete variables, including measures of institutions and human capital
accumulation, and indicator variables giving country-specific events that will
influence transition probabilities. In the latter group, I include measures of wars
and natural disasters, along with episodes of both economic reform and sudden
stops in capital flows. In estimating the model, I start with a rather parsimonious
specification, including two explanatory variables, a measure of political institutions
and a measure of human capital accumulation. I will also consider more complex
specifications, bearing in mind, however, the limitations imposed through the
availability of data.
The Markov regime-switching specification outlined above is estimated using
annual data on growth of output per worker from Penn World Tables 6.2. Initial
estimations are performed using the full set of countries for which data is available
for the growth rate of output per worker from 1962-1994, obtained from the Penn
World Tables 6.1. The institutional measure in this case is the ICRG index. This is
a measure of the quality of economic institutions across five different dimensions:
government corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, repudiation of government
contracts, and expropriation. The measure is based on an aggregation across a
number of risk factors. Individual risk assessments are made by the staff of the
Political Risk Service Group. For comparability to Jerzmanowski, the average value
from 1986-1995 is used. The full data set is a balanced panel for 94 countries.
The quality of political institutions is measured by the polity variable from
the Polity IV dataset. This variable is calculated by subtracting an autocracy
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measure from a measure of democracy. The quality of democracy is measured along
several dimensions, including the competitiveness of political participation and
executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the
powers of the executive branch of government. The autocracy measure looks at the
same dimensions, along with regulations of political participation. Human capital
accumulation is measured using total years of schooling from the Barro-Lee dataset.
To make the data most comparable across countries, I use total years of schooling
for the population over 25 years of age. As the data is only available at 5 year
intervals from 1960-1999, I interpolate the data. There are 68 countries with data
on output per worker from 1962-2003, and measures of political institutions and
human capital accumulation, over this same period.
Finally, another time-varying measure of economic institutions is available,
the rule of law dimension of the Economic Freedom Index, compiled by the Fraser.
Institute. I focus on this dimension, rather than including all of the dimensions, as
some of the others are primarily the reflection of policies rather than the institutions
themselves. The rule of law dimension focuses specifically on legal structure and the
security of property rights. This measure of the rule of law has been less used than
measures such as the ICRG which have limited time variation and are typically
employed in cross-sectional growth regressions, but has the advantage of allowing
for time-variation in institutions over a sample of 48 countries and 33 years.
Prior to 1995, the rule of law measure contained within the Economic
Freedom Index was measured along two dimensions: security of property and
support for the rule of law. These are measured using a compilation of data from
the ICRG and the World Competitiveness Report. Rule of law is measured after
1995 along seven dimensions: judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of
property rights, military interference in rule of law, integrity of the legal system,
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legal enforcement of contracts, and regulatory restrictions on the sale of real
property. The first two dimensions are measured via responses to the Global
Competitiveness Report's survey questions on judicial independence and functioning
of courts. Military interference and judicial integrity is based on measures from the
ICRG. The last two dimension are based on the World Bank's" Doing Business"
estimates.
IV.4 Results
First, I estimate the transition probabilities for the full sample, allowing for
these probabilities to be affected by the ICRG index, as in Jerzmanowski (2006).
The only difference between my estimation and his is that my full sample includes
94 countries, rather than 89. The ARI-parameter results, given in table(IV.2) and
(IV.3), are relatively similar for the stable growth, stagnation and miracle growth
states (1,2 and 4 respectively). State 3, roughly equivalent to periods of crisis, has a
significantly larger long-run growth rate in the full sample. However, I note that the
likelihood of being in this state is primarily driven by high volatility of economic
growth.
Tab. IV.2: AR-l parameters, full sample, control variables: ICRG
State Constant (f-li) AR Coeff'(¢i) Std. Dev. (O"i) Long-run growth
1 1.283 (0.0061)** 0.3737(0.0008)** 2.569(0.041)** 2.05
2 -0.0841(0.0869) 0.1844(0.0225)** 5.868 (0.2856)** -0.07
3 2.948 (0.0632)** -0.0648 (0.0048)** 13.737 (0.345)** 2.77
4 4.8753 (0.0096)** 0.0972 (0.0028)** 4.212 (0.046)** 5.4
Standard errors in parentheses. **Significance at 5% level. State 1: stable
growth, State 2: stagnation, State 3: crisis, State 4: miracle growth
Figure (IV.l) shows the transition probabilities given a particular initial
state. For countries that start out in stable growth, which have a significantly high
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Tab. IV.3: AR-1 parameters, Jerzmanowski sample of 89 countries, 1962-1994, control
variables: ICRG
State Constant Cf-Li) AR Coeff'.C¢i) Std. Dev. CO-i) Long-run growth
1 1.32** 0.3761 ** 2.11 ** 2.12
2 0.1 0.1799** 4.56** 0.12
3 -1.01** -0.0045 13.16** -1.00
4 5.36** 0.1417** 2.71** 6.25
**Significance at 5% level, State 1: stable growth, state 2: stagnation, state
3: crisis, state 4: miracle growth
level of the ICRG index, the probability of remaining in the stable growth regime is
very high, while it is close to zero for countries below that threshold. These
countries are most likely to transition to the crisis state. Countries currently in
stagnation and with a low quality of institutions, high probability of remaining in
that state. But, for countries with high quality of institutions, there is increasing
probability of transition either to stable growth, or to miracle growth. As in the
case of stagnation, highest probability of remaining in crisis occurs in countries with
low quality of institutions. As institutions improve, there is a sharp increase in the
likelihood of miracle growth. In the case of miracle growth, countries with poor
quality of institutions are most likely to move to the crisis regime. As institutions
improve, countries are most likely to either remain in miracle growth, or to
transition to stable growth.
But these results are entirely based on the assumption that institutions, and
thus transition probabilities, are constant over time. Figures (IV.2-IV.5) give the
changes in the probabilities of being in the four growth regimes, for four countries,
Argentina, Bolivia, Ghana and South Africa, that experienced significant changes in
their political institutions over the sample period. The polity measure for Argentina
declined from -1 to -9 in 1966, and increased from -9 to 6 in 1973. This corresponds
to a sharp increase, then decrease in the probability of being in the stable growth
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regime. Similarly, the sharp decrease in the polity measure in Bolivia during the
mid 1970's corresponds to a sharp increase in the probability of being in the stable
growth regime, as opposed to stagnation. Finally, the positive and abrupt changes
in polity in Ghana are associated with sharp increases in the probability of being in
the stable growth regime. Similarly, there is a brief but noticeable decline in the
probability of being in the stable growth regime in South Africa in 1992 during the
change of regime there.
What are the consequences of imposing that the transition probabilities are
determined by the averaged value, rather than the time-varying institutional
measure? The institutional measure is used, in the first order condition for fJiOil to
weight the smoothed probabilities. When the averaged value is used, the weight is
constant across time. The sole variation that can be used to explain differences in
transition probabilities are cross-sectional differences in institutions. Let us then
turn our attention to the two other data samples, the polity sample, and the
economic freedom sample, containing data for 68 countries and 48 countries
respectively. These two samples are characterized by slightly higher quality of
institutions and slightly lower volatility of economic growth.
Tab. IVA: AR-1 parameters, polity sample, control variables: polity
State Constant C/-Li) AR Coeff.C¢i) Std. Dev. CO-i) Long-run growth
1 0.8527(0.0094) 0.3712 (0.0003) 1.962(0.0270) 1.356
2 1.8697 (0.0479) 0.3944 (0.0014) 3.025(0.0959) 3.087
3 11.074 (0.0731) -0.861 (0.0015) 15.103 (0.264) 5.95
4 -0.15 (0.0385) 0.1007 (0.0023) 6.374 (0.142) -0.024
Standard errors in parentheses. State 1: stable growth, state 2: stagnation,
state 3: crisis, state 4: miracle growth
Tables (IVA) and (IV.5) give the AR-1 parameter estimates, by state, for the
two samples. For the polity sample, the interpretation of states is no longer
consistent with what it was under the full sample. The first state is similar, and
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Tab. IV.5: AR-1 parameters, economic freedom sample, 4 regimes, control variables:
economic freedom, average years of schooling
State Constant (/-Li) AR Coeff.(¢i) Std. Dev. (O"i) Long-run growth
1 0.8192(0.094) 0.1621(0.004) 4.657(0.527) 0.9778
2 0.7853(0.01) 0.3641(0.001) 1.935(0.08) 1.4553
3 0.1346(0.06) 0.1161(0.002) 6.5701(0.348) 0.1523
4 3.234(0.008) 0.3182(0.005) 2.8487(0.139) 4.7432
Standard errors in parentheses. State 1: slow growth, state 2: stable growth,
state 3: crisis, state 4: miracle growth
roughly corresponds to the stable growth state, although its long-run growth rate
and volatility are slightly lower than before. State 4 roughly corresponds to state 2
or stagnation in the full sample, with a long-run growth rate that is close to zero,
and higher volatility than the stable growth rate. State 2 in the polity sample is
most similar to the miracle growth state, or state 4 under the full sample, although
with a lower growth rate on average, lower volatility and higher persistence. The
most striking difference is in state 3. In both samples, this corresponds to the
highest volatility of all the growth regimes, and is the sole to have a negative AR-1
coefficient. However, there is a dramatic increase in the intercept and AR-1
coefficient, with the result that the long-run growth rate of this state is much higher
than in the full sample. Examples of this state include Ghana(1963-1966,
1968-1972), Iran(1976-1977), and Israel (1968), all of which involve significant
volatility in economic growth and disruptions due to political crisis or the Six-Day
War in the case of Israel.
Figure (IV.6) shows the variation in the transition probabilities with the
polity index. The states can best be described as follows: state 1 corresponds to
stable growth, state 2 to miracle growth, state 3 to crisis, and state 4 to stagnation.
Autocratic countries, with polity <= 0, will transition from stable growth to
stagnation with probabilities close to 1. The most democratic countries are most
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likely to remain in the stable growth regime. However, in democratic countries with
autocratic tendencies, i.e. with polity rv 0, the probability of switching to miracle
growth approaches 1. This would include countries such as South Korea and
Thailand that experienced a combination of autocratic regimes and miracle growth.
Having once entered either rapid growth or stagnation, countries are most
likely to remain there, regardless of the quality of their political institutions,
although institutional quality will slightly increase the likelihood of remaining in the
rapid growth state, and decrease the likelihood of remaining in stagnation. On the
other hand, institutions do have a significant effect of transition probabilities out of
the crisis state. The most autocratic countries are the most likely to remain in this
state, while the most democratic countries will transition to the miracle growth
regime.
Suppose now that we consider an alternative measure of institutions, the
economic freedom index, which is more focused on the rule of law and the security
of property than measuring the functioning of political institutions. The sample of
countries is the smallest of all those I have considered, as complete data, on both
economic freedom and human capital, is only available for 48 countries, from
1970-2003. Economic growth is the least volatile in this sample, while the average
ICRG index is the highest. The four growth regimes roughly correspond (in
numerical order) to stable growth, slow growth, stagnation and miracle growth.
Stagnation in this sample corresponds to the highest volatility growth regime. The
distinction between the stable growth and slow growth regimes lies primarily in
reduced volatility, lower long-run growth and higher persistence. Thus, countries
characterized by a high average probability of being in the slow growth regime are
Japan, the countries of Western Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States.
The difference in the identification in growth regimes is primarily driven by the fact
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that even when using the transition probabilities as estimated in the full sample, the
countries in the economic freedom sample spend under 3% of their time, on average,
in the crisis state (state 3 for the full sample). The slow growth and stable growth
states are both similar to the stable growth state in the full sample. An alternative
approach would be to restrict the number of states for this sample to three: stable
growth, stagnation, and miracle growth.
Tab. IV.6: AR-l parameters, economic freedom sample, 3 regimes, control variables:
economic freedom, average years of schooling
State Constant (fLi) AR Coeff.(¢i) Std. Dev. (O"i) Long-run growth
1 0.9373(0.003) 0.3641(0.0005) 1.969(0.046) 1.474
2 0.566(0.007) 0.0788(0.002) 6.244(0.201) 0.614
3 1.449(0.002) 0.4847(0.0002) 2.795(0.053) 2.812
Standard errors in parentheses. State 1: stable growth, state 2: crisis, state
3: rapid growth
For this sample, I allow for the transition probabilities to be jointly
determined by the economic freedom index and average years of schooling. Figure
(IV.7) shows the effect of the rule of law on transition probabilities, when the
country has the sample average level of schooling. Figure (IV.8) shows the effect of
schooling for countries with the average level of economic freedom. The transition
probabilities for the stable growth and slow growth regimes are unaffected by the
quality of the legal system, and countries in these regimes are most likely to remain
there.
However, the rule of law does significantly affect the transition probabilities
for stagnation and miracle growth. Poor rule of law increases the probability of
remaining in stagnation, while countries with the greatest protection of property
rights are most likely to transition to stable growth. Those countries with
intermediate quality of economic institutions will likely transition to miracle growth.
These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the polity sample.
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Finally, poor institutions increases the likelihood of switching from miracle growth
to stable growth, while better quality of institutions increases the likelihood of
remaining in this regime. Again, we see that the effect of the rule of law and the
quality of political institutions is similar.
While Barro and Lee measures of human capital frequently do not have a
significant impact in cross-sectional growth regressions, the average number of years
of schooling does significantly affect the transition probability for every initial state
except for stable growth. Countries currently in the slow growth regime will remain
there if their human capital is sufficiently high, and transition to miracle growth if
not. The latter result is consistent with the interpretation of miracle growth as the
transition path between steady states corresponding respectively to low and high
levels of investment in human capital. Countries currently in the miracle growth
regime will tend to remain there, but their probability of doing so is initially
increasing, then decreasing in the level of human capital. The likelihood of
switching from miracle growth to stagnation is increasing in the level of schooling.
Finally, countries with low levels of human capital are most likely to remain in
stagnation. The transition probability to miracle growth is increasing then
decreasing in the level of schooling. This is primarily because the most developed
countries are most likely to return to slow growth, rather than miracle growth.
Overall, the results for the effect of the economic freedom index are similar
to those for the polity measure, with the exception that the crisis regime is not
populated sufficiently in the economic freedom sample. Allowing for the time
variation of the economic freedom index increases the average probability of being
in the miracle growth regime. Similarly, allowing for time variation in the polity
measure, increases the average probability of both stagnation and miracle growth.
The results contrast with cross-sectional growth regressions in that measures of
112
economic and political institutions are found to have similar and significant effects
on patterns of growth, as does human capital accumulation.
As a further robustness check, I have also estimated the four-regime model,
where the economic freedom index, the polity index, and the average number of
years of schooling are all included as control variables for the transition
probabilities. The results from this estimation are included in figures
(IV.9-IV.11)and in table (IV.7). First of all, the ordering and the value of the AR-l
parameters are different from those in table (IV.5). 2 Most significant is that with
the exception of the stable growth regime, most regimes see an increase in volatility.
The crisis regime can be more clearly identified, due to a strongly negative long-run
growth rate, while the stagnation regime also has a lower average growth rate.
Tab. IV.7: AR-l parameters, economic freedom sample, 4 regimes,
control variables: economic freedom, average years of schooling, polity
State Constant (/.Li) AR Coeff'(¢i) Std. Dev. (O"i) Long-run growth
1 3.0793(0.02) 0.271(0.0003) 4.5 (0.2814) 4.224
2 -0.9174(0.03) 0.5267(0.009) 6.012 (0.2441) -1.938
3 0.6088(0.0319) 0.1379(0.0007) 5.576 (0.2472) 0.7062
4 1.0672(0.0024) 0.4417(0.0015) 2.3173 (0.1296) 1.912
Standard errors in parentheses, state 1: mIracle growth, state 2: crisis, state
3: stagnation, state 4: stable growth
Of particular interest are the transition probabilities when we control for
both political and economic institutions. For the case of stagnation, crisis, and
miracle growth regimes, none of the various control variables effect transition
probabilities on the margin are affected by economic/political institutions or by
human capital accumulations. However, all three of the measures do have a
significant effect of transitions out of stable growth. The quality of both political
and economic institutions will increase the probability of remaining in the stable
2The ordering of states is arbitrary, and differences between specifications in this regard are
irrelevant
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growth state, and reduce the probability of transition to crisis. On the other hand,
for countries at the average level of political and economic institutions, human
capital accumulation will reduce the probability of remaining in stable growth and
increase the probability of entering an economic crisis.
Due to the fact that the figures are based upon mean levels of other relevant
variables, they do not give a complete description of the behavior of transition
probabilities. That said, the sign of these marginal effects is robust to changes in
the level of institutions/human capital at which the effect is evaluated. These
results imply primarily that political institutions and economic institutions are
substitutes in increasing the probability of remaining in the stable growth regimes,
while human capital accumulation in the presence of mediocre institutions may
actually reduce the stability of the stable growth regime.
IV.5 Conclusion
The empirical growth literature has been dominated by cross-sectional
growth regressions in various forms, including increasingly sophisticated approaches
to the econometric analysis, but which ignore time-wise variations in growth. In
order to capture switches between growth regimes, I estimate a Markov-switching
regression using cross country data on growth rates of output per worker. In the
specification employed by Jerzmanowski (2006), transition probabilities are
determined by a single static measure of institutions, the ICRG index. In this
chapter, I explore the effects of two alternative, time-varying institutional measures
-- the polity and economic freedom index. In addition, my final specification allows
for human capital to also affect the transition probability matrix. Theoretical
models indicate that there can be significant threshold effects of both institutions
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and human capital on economic growth. Convergence to a poverty trap equilibrium
implies stagnation in economic growth, human capital accumulation and
institutional quality, while the balanced growth equilibrium implies stable economic
growth, along with high quality of institutions and human capital accumulation,
both of which will increase over time. The empirical results confirm this, and in
addition find that allowing for the time variation of both institutions and human
capital will increase the likelihood of identifying the regime as miracle growth or
stagnation rather than as stable growth. That is, the time variation of the variables
determining transition probabilities permits us to more easily identify transitions
between poverty trap and balanced growth equilibria.
This chapter provides an initial approach to estimating time varying
transition probabilities in a Markov switching model of economic growth. However,
because of significant time involved in each estimation, not all specifications have
been completely explored, including the inclusion of human capital along with the
institutional measure in the polity sample. In addition, future work would test the
appropriateness of the specification, including the number of regimes, possibly via
Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, there is evidence that the AR-l parameters,
specifically the intercept and volatility terms, depend significantly on institutional
and human capital measures, suggesting that the growth regimes themselves may
depend on the level of development. This is certainly worthy of further investigation.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has focused on the extent to which models characterized by
multiple equilibria can explain both the income gap between developed and
developing countries, and the volatility in growth typically displayed in developing
economies. Of particular interest were the roles that institutions and human capital
may play in the formation of multiple equilibria, as well as the conditions which
allow for escapes from poverty traps. These questions were treated in three essays.
The first two essays broadly explored the role that economic institutions and human
capital externalities play in the formation of poverty traps and in transitions out of
such traps. The final essay examined the importance of time variation of
institutions and human capital accumulation in determining transitions between
growth regimes, using Markov regime switching regressions.
The first essay considered the role of the quality of institutions, and the
ability of the government to commit to institutional reform over an infinite horizon.
In marked contrast to previous models in this literature, I found that variations in
the quality of institutions will not necessarily generate poverty traps. However, as
one might expect, the steady state level of legal infrastructure, or protection against
appropriation, is increasing in the return to appropriation, while the level of
effective protection of output is decreasing. If returns to appropriation vary
systematically across countries, and are monotonically increasing in the level of
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development, then protection of output will increase as countries develop. In the
case where the government is able to commit to reform, there is a single steady
state. The poverty trap result, for a given return to appropriation, is only obtained
when governments are incapable of committing to future policy, and thus may
overinvest in property rights.
The second essay focused on the global dynamics of models with multiple
equilibria. Under perfect foresight, in a model of economic growth with human
capital externalities, there is no possible transition path between the poverty trap
and the upper steady state. Furthermore, simply allowing for rational expectations
and stochastic shocks to aggregate productivity may not be sufficient to force
countries out of the poverty trap, as such productivity shocks may generate further
investment in physical rather than human capital. However, either expectational
shocks or adaptive learning, or a combination thereof, may increase perceived
returns to human capital sufficiently to allow the economy to escape poverty. This
essay, in addition to illustrating significant differences between dynamics under
learning and under perfect foresight, also points to significant differences between
econometric learning and social learning which merit further exploration.
Finally, the third essay analyzed the role of time variation in institutions and
human capital accumulation on transitions between economic growth regimes, and
thus in explaining differences in patterns of economic growth across countries. In
contrast to the results of most cross-country growth regressions, I find that
measures of both political institutions and human capital accumulation have a
significant effect on transitions between growth regimes. In particular, countries
with the highest quality of both political and economic institutions are most likely
to remain in a stable growth regime. The improvement in fit when using dynamic
measures of institutions as opposed to the more typical static measures, suggests
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that both economic and political institutions may not be as stable, particularly in
developing countries, as previously thought.
The third essay in fact provides to some extent an empirical test of the first
two essays. The first essay proposed that there may exist a continuum of steady
states, even under commitment, indexed by the return to appropriation. Countries
with the lowest return to appropriation have higher incomes, due both to spending
less resources on law enforcement and to have higher effective protection of output.
Furthermore, if countries with high institutional quality also are more likely to
commit to reform programs, then such countries are more likely to escape the
poverty trap and move toward stable growth. These results are captured at least in
part in the empirical results of the third essay. Similarly, the second essay indicates
that a dramatic increase in human capital will frequently be associated with a
transition out of the poverty trap, but that the simultaneous growth in human
capital and output will not necessarily continue in the future. Once again, the
results of the third essay do indicate a significant role of human capital
accumulation in growth transitions. Both the empirical and theoretical results of
this dissertation indicate the importance of not ignoring the role that nonlinear
dynamics may play in helping us to explain differences in growth patterns across
countries. Furthermore, I anticipate that the theoretical work in this dissertation
may form the foundation for further research on the role of expectations in the
process of economic growth, and on the effect of a lack of commitment to reform on
economic outcomes.
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